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INFORMATION PRIVACY AND INTERNET
COMPANY INSOLVENCIES: WHEN A BUSINESS
FAILS, DOES DIVESTITURE OR BANKRUPTCY
BETTER PROTECT THE CONSUMER?
FarahZ. Usmani*

INTRODUCTION

Between the Internet bubble burst' and the current economic
recession,2 corporate bankruptcy filings are increasing.' Sales of
" To Matt.
1. The Internet bubble burst refers to the meteoric rise and overvaluation of
Internet company stocks in 1998 and 1999 and the subsequent devaluation and
failure of such companies in 2000 and 2001. See generally Andres Rueda, The Hot
IPO Phenomenon and the Great Internet Bust, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 21
(2001); see also Francis G. Conrad, Dot.coms in Bankruptcy Valuations Under
Title 11 or www.Snipehunt in the Dark.noreorg/noassets.com,9 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 417, 418-20 (2001). For lists of now defunct Internet companies, see
generally http://www.disobey.com/ghostsites/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2002),
http://www.upside.com/graveyard/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2002),
http://www.hoovers.com/news/detail/0,2417,11_3584,00.html (last visited Sept. 20,
2002).
2. See David Leonhardt, Recovery and the Reluctant Consumer, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 2001, at CI ("A chief cause of the current recession has been the sharp
decline in business spending, which has fallen as a result of the overcapacity
caused by excessive investments in the booming late 90's.").
3. See PricewaterhouseCoopers:2001/2002 Bankruptcy Filings Will Exceed
Last Recession; 200 Public Company Filings Forecastfor 2002-Second Year of
Record
Levels,
PR
NEWSWIRE,
Mar.
11,
2002
(citing
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,

PHOENIX

FORECAST:

BANKRUPTCIES

AND

RESTRUCrURINGS 2002 (2002)) ("The record number of [public company]
bankruptcies in 2001 and forecast for 2002 represent a 127% and 77% increase
over [the average from 1986-2000] respectively. Private company bankruptcy
filings are also expected to show record increases in 2002."); see also Avital
Louria Hahn, New Economy, Bad Math; Street Analysts Take a Deserved Rap for
Their E-Commerce Valuations, INVESTMENT DEALERS DIG., Oct. 23, 2000
("Many companies in [the e-commerce] sector, if not bankrupt, are off 90% of
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substantially all of the assets of companies that have opted to close
their doors or exit a particular line of business are also increasing.'
Of course, the creditors of these companies are desperate to
maximize their recoveries.' None of this is particularly surprising.
However, a new problem has arisen in the cases of e-commerce
companies seeking to liquidate their assets -their privacy promises
to users could prevent the sale of customer lists compiled by the
now floundering Internet companies.
The sale of customer lists is not a new method to increase the
capital available to failing companies.6 However, the nature of the
contact between consumer and retailer has changed with the
advent of e-commerce' Moreover, the manner in which customer
lists were compiled in the past and the way they are compiled by
Internet companies today differs greatly.8 The terms under which
such information is collected has also changed Because of these
changes in the interactions between buyers and sellers, all
customer lists are not treated equally when a company chooses to

their highs ....Bankruptcies of dot-coms are now as commonplace as IPOs once
were.");
(last visited Sept. 19, 2002)
http://www.bankruptcydata.com/default.asp
(indicating that public company bankruptcy filings in 2000 were 176, in 2001 were
257, in January 2002 were 17, and in February 2002 were 29).
4. See Eleni Chamis, High (and Low) Lights of 2001: Best New Idea:
Bid4Assets, WASH. Bus. J., Dec. 28, 2001 (stating that as the "tech landscape has
become littered with Internet failures and consolidations, Bid4Assets has been
there to pick up the pieces" by selling the assets of failed businesses in online
auctions), availableat
http://washington.bizjournals.com/washington/stories/2001/12/31/story3.html (last
visited Sept. 18, 2002); see also Letter from Marc Rotenberg & Andrew Shen,
Electronic Privacy Information Center, to Federal Trade Commission & National
Association of Attorneys General (May 25, 2001) ("[M]any companies will be
merged, acquired or sold off piece by piece in the course of a bankruptcy."),
available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/internet/etour.html (last visited Sept. 24,
2002) [hereinafter EPIC letter].
5. See Harvey L. Tepner, Value Added, Value Subtracted: Advising the
Debtor, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2001; see also infra Part II.A.1.
6. See infra Part II.B.2.
7. See infra Part II.B.2.
8. See infra Part II.B.2.
9. See infra Part II.B.2.
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sell its assets due to bankruptcy or failure."
This Note further explores this conflict. Part I provides an
overview of the goals of bankruptcy law and presents the relevant
statutes, in both the brick and mortar and Internet business
contexts. The section concludes that the goals of bankruptcy law
favor the sale of customer lists.
Part II defines the term customer list, discusses the use and
sale of customer lists for both traditional brick and mortar
businesses" and Internet retailers, explains the current legal
protections available to e-commerce customers, and considers
policy concerns about data privacy and Internet commerce. Part II
concludes that there exists a clear conflict between the treatment
of customer lists for brick and mortar businesses and e-commerce
businesses.
Part III discusses the conflict between the goals of bankruptcy
law and the problems of consumer privacy present in e-commerce,
which does not generally exist in brick and mortar businesses.
Specifically, the discussion focuses on the seminal Toysmart case
and its consequences on other Internet businesses and concludes
that while the Toysmart case has caused many Internet retailers to
change their policies, the problem has not been permanently
resolved. No one has addressed the differing outcomes possible
between brick and mortar and Internet sales.
Part IV provides a discussion of currently proposed and
pending legislation in the area of e-commerce privacy. This section
concludes that while the bills under consideration may resolve the
privacy issues of Internet business customers, they will not resolve
the fact that different outcomes occur in the e-commerce and brick
and mortar retail businesses.
This Note concludes that the treatment of customer lists in
bankruptcies and acquisitions differs greatly. Additionally, the
differing outcomes in the sale of customer lists in different types of
bankruptcy have not been considered by courts, legislators, or even
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). Furthermore, this final
section proposes that greater public awareness is needed by
10. See infra Parts II.C, III.
11. For the sake of brevity, the term brick and mortar in this Note will
include mail-order businesses.
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consumers, many of whom do not realize that their information is
subject to divesture even when they conduct business with
traditional brick and mortar businesses. As a result, any pending
legislation should aim for a consistent outcome in bankruptcy
proceedings and ideally should protect the privacy rights of all
consumers, both Internet and traditional.
I.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF BANKRUPTCY

When the Internet bubble burst, many e-commerce businesses
went out of business, merged with other companies, or declared
bankruptcy. 2 For many of these companies, one of their most
valuable assets was their customer list.'3 Other valuable intangible
assets included domain names, 4 licensed technology, 5 and human
capital. 6 In contrast, physical goods, such as computers, desks,
stock, and other office equipment have not been in great demand
12.

See

Paul

Davidson,

Dying

Dot-corn's

Customers

Coveted,

USATODAY.COM, June 19, 2001 ("Many [e-commerce businesses] did not file for

bankruptcy
protection."),
available
at
http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/2001-01-30-dying-dot-coms.htm
(last
visited Jan. 24, 2002); see also EPIC Letter, supra note 4 ("[A]s the e-commerce
industry is undergoing a tumultuous period, it is likely that the public and
policymakers will continue to confront scenarios [where the sale of a customer
list is part of a merger and not an outright sale].").
13. See Arlene Weintraub, E-Assets for Sale-Dirt Cheap, BUSINESSWEEK
ONLINE, May 14, 2001, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01_02/b3732716.htm (last visited
Jan. 24, 2002); see also Scott E. Blakeley, E-Bankruptcy Creditors' Committees'
Implications of the Toysmart.com Case, MANAGING CREDIT RECEIVABLES &
COLLECTION, May 2001; Walter W. Miller & Maureen A. O'Rourke, Bankruptcy
Law v. Privacy Rights: Which Holds the Trump Card?, 38 HouS. L. REV. 777, 779
(2001); Hal F. Morris & Flora A. Fearon, Texas Attorney General: Privacy Is Not
for Sale, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2000; Davidson, supra note 12; accord John
M. Wingate, The New Economania: Consumer Privacy, Bankruptcy, and Venture
Capital at Odds in the Internet Marketplace, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 895, 908
(2001). For a definition and thorough discussion of customer lists, see infra Part
II.
14. For a discussion of how to value the assets of a dot.com, see generally
Conrad, supra note 1.
15. See Blakeley, supra note 13.
16. See id.
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or of great value. 7 In fact, tangible assets are becoming more and
more difficult to sell."
Because of the diminishing value of tangible goods, companies
looking to maximize the return for their creditors or shareholders
are desperate to sell whatever they can-including customer lists
that are protected by promises of privacy. 9 These privacy promises
and the goals of defunct companies to maximize the value of their
estates have created a conflict that could result in either smaller
estates or the sale and dissemination of customer information
obtained under a confidentiality promise." Potentially, consumer
privacy may be violated in an effort to increase the value of estates.
Nonetheless, these days, "[c]ustomer information will likely be one
of the most significant assets of a failed Internet business."2"
A. Duties of Trustees
When a company declares Chapter 7 bankruptcy and seeks
liquidation, the U.S. Trustee must appoint a trustee, or serve as
trustee itself." "The trustee shall collect and reduce to money the
property of the estate for which such trustee serves, and close such
estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of
parties in interest."' The basic goal of liquidation is to maximize
the value of the estate.24 A responsible trustee will seek to sell the
customer list of a defunct e-commerce business, especially where it
has greater value than tangible items that are not realizing their
true value at sale.
17. See Weintraub, supra note 13 ("[Tlangible goods.., typically go for little
more than 30 cents on the dollar.").
18. See Weintraub, supra note 13. Even intangible goods are getting harder

to sell. See, e.g., id. (noting that eToys "hasn't been able to sell the warehouse
management system it spent two years and $80 million to develop to ensure that
1 million toys would be under Christmas trees on time").
19. See Davidson, supra note 12.
20. See infra Part III.
21. Richard A. Beckmann, Privacy Policies and Empty Promises: Closing the
"Toysmart Loophole," 62 U. Pri-r. L. REv. 765, 772 (2001); see also Blakeley,
supra note 13.
22- See 28 U.S.C. §§ 586(a)(1)-(2) (2000).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 704(1) (2000).
24. See Wingate, supra note 13, at 912; see also Blakeley, supra note 13.
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Likewise, a creditor may opt to create a creditors' committee
to aid the trustee.25 "Members of a creditors' committee owe a
duty of trust, responsibility, and undivided loyalty to unsecured
creditors" and "[w]hen a committee fails to exercise its duties
carefully or a committee makes false or inaccurate statements
intending to injure the debtor, members may be subject to suits
from the debtor or creditors."26
Therefore, the creditors'
committees also seek to maximize the value of the estate, 7 both for
themselves and for the sake of the unsecured creditors they
represent.
B. Bankruptcy Basics
A bankruptcy estate "is comprised of all the following
property, wherever located and by whomever held.., all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case."28 Moreover, "an interest of the
debtor in property becomes property of the estate ...
notwithstanding any provision in an agreement, transfer
instrument, or applicable nonbankruptcy law that
restricts or
29
debtor.,
the
by
interest
such
of
transfer
conditions
While there has been a debate as to whether a customer list is
property or a contract between the parties, 30 courts have

25. See 11 U.S.C. § 705 (2000).
26. See Blakeley, supra note 13.
27. See id.
28. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (2000).
29. Id. § 541(c)(1)(A); see also Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 811.
30. For a discussion of the property versus contract theories underlining
customer lists, see generally Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 782-807; see
also infra Part II.B.2 (discussing how customer lists are often treated as trade
secrets, implying that they are property); infra note 97 and accompanying text
(explaining how the tax implications of the sale of customer lists imply that they
are property). The bankruptcy court allows the trustee, with the permission of
the court, to complete or reject an executory contract. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2000). An
executory contract is "[a] contract that remains wholly unperformed or for which
there remains something still to be done on both sides." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 135 (New Pocket ed. 1996). For a brief discussion of whether
customer lists as contracts could be binding under 11 U.S.C. § 365, see infra note
102.
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traditionally classified customer lists as property.3 1 As property,
customer lists can be sold.12 "Customer lists 'were intended by
Congress to fall within the scope of [Section] 541.' ', 3D Even if the
lists are considered to be contracts, and not property, bankruptcy
courts could allow for the sale of the lists, despite any privacy
promises, because of the primary goal to maximize the estate's
value.34 Of course, while allowing such a sale would increase estate
value, it would fail to consider the public's interest in keeping its
information private35 or the importance of holding companies to
promises they make,36 which may induce customers to enter into
relationships with those businesses, even if such agreements are
not legally binding.
Nonetheless, Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy
Code to supercede the rights of regulatory agencies - such as the
Federal Trade Commission - in the exercise of their powers.38
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or
stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, safety, or similar
police or regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for
violation of such a law,"39 the unit or agency is not subject to the
general bankruptcy stay which prevents the "commencement or
continuation... of a judicial, administrative, or other action or
proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been
commenced before" the bankruptcy.'
As such, filing for

31. See, e.g., Phillips v. Diecast Mktg. Innovations, L.L.C., 2000 Bankr. LExIs
615 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000); cf. In re Prof'l Sales Corp., 48 B.R. 651, 660 (1985)
("If the disputed interest adds great value to the estate, as it does here [where the
interest in the property was conditional], it was intended by Congress to fall

within the scope of § 541."); see also Beckmann, supra note 21, at 776.
32. See generally infra Part I.
33. Beckmann, supra note 21, at 776 (quoting In re Prof'l Sales Corp., 48 B.R.
651, 660 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985)).
34. See Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 807-11.
35. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
36. See Eli Lilly Agrees to Improve On-Line Security, WHITE HOUSE BULL.,
Jan. 18, 2002 (quoting Howard Beales, FTC Protector of Consumer Information).
37. See id.
38. See S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 109-10 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5838; see also Beckmann, supra note 21, at 777.
39. See Beckmann, supra note 21, at 777.
40. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2000); see also Beckmann, supra note 21, at
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bankruptcy is not meant to prevent the FTC from enforcing
privacy promises. However, because the bankruptcy court retains
jurisdiction over a debtor's assets, such as a customer list, it could
"still retain discretion to decide that the bankruptcy process
supersedes the consumer protection laws.""
Aside from the above, a bankruptcy court:
may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No
provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by a
party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from,
sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination
necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders
42
or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.

This allows bankruptcy courts to act "as courts of equity, and
[they] are authorized to issue any order, process or judgment that

is necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions of the
[Bankruptcy] Code." 3 Clearly, the above discussion demonstrates
that the powers of the bankruptcy courts are quite broad.
II. THE USE OF AND LEGAL STATUS OF CUSTOMER LISTS
The scope of customer lists has grown with the development of
technology." While some aspects of consumer protection have
been addressed in the legal arena, including the sale of customer
lists in the brick and mortar context, 5 the sale of similar e777. But see In re Prof'l Sales Corp., 48 B.R. 651, 658, 660-61 (Bankr. E.D. Ill.
1985) (granting an injunction in favor of a bankrupt company and overriding the
claims of sovereign immunity by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
and its decision to disallow the bankrupt company's use of its property until the
agency could review the debtor's application. The EPA's decision adversely
affected the value of the property because "sovereign immunity is largely waived
in the bankruptcy context;" "the grant of an injunction would harm the EPA
minimally;" "there is a strong policy in favor of successful rehabilitation of
debtors;" and the debtor company would suffer harm without the injunction).
41. Beckmann, supra note 21, at 778.
42. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2000).
43. Beckmann, supra note 21, at 778-79.
44. See infra Part II.C.1.
45. See infra Part II.B.2.
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commerce lists has not been specifically dealt with.
A. What Is a Customer List?
"A customer list is literally just that-a list of customers. '
Traditionally, these lists included names, 7 addresses, ' phone
numbers, 9 and perhaps billing information. 0 This information is
given by customers in order to pay for and receive the order.
According to former FTC official Peter Ward, "[i]n the brick-andmortar world, you give your name and information as part of a
transaction, and there is typically no representation on the part of
a seller that that information will be protected.""1
"The aggregate customer list is more than the simple sum of its
parts.
The [company's] ingenuity, innovation and effort in
compiling the list make it valuable. It is the list that has value, not
the information of one particular customer.""
In addition to information directly compiled by retailers,
companies also have the option of purchasing lists from data
brokers. 3 Such information varies from medical information 4 to
46. Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 782 (stating that a customer list
"may be more or less detailed, containing simply basic information like names
and addresses, or exhaustive data on a customer's financial position and shopping
preferences.").
47. See id. at 783; see also Morris & Fearon, supra note 13.
48. See Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 783; see also Morris & Fearon,
supra note 13.
49. See Vince Salas, CPNI- Coping with Compliance, WIRELESS REv., Feb.
1, 1999; see also Morris & Fearon, supra note 13.
50. See Don F. Farineau & Royce E. Chaffin, Amortizing Intangible Assets,
NAT'L PUB. Acr., Aug. 1992, at 32; see also Morris & Fearon, supra note 13.
51. Jennifer Jones & James Evans, Web Privacy Lapse by E-tailer Toysmart
Prompts FTC Action, INFOWORLD, July 17, 2000, at 26.
52. Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 813.
53. Many companies sell customer information, including Acxiom, available
at
http://www.acxiom.comlDisplayMainlO,1494,USA-en-519-2537-0-0-,00.htm
(last visited Sept. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Acxiom] (selling consumer, business, and
telephone data) and MSS Inc., available at http://www.mmslists.com/ (last visited
Sept. 19, 2002) [hereinafter MSS] (selling healthcare lists, including personal
medical
information),
VentureDirect
Worldwide,
available
at
http://www.venturedirect.com/scripts/index.php?home (last visited Sept. 19, 2002)
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hobbies"' to ethnicity. 6 Customer lists can also be purchased from
competitors or other businesses."
However, due to the advent and rapid development of the
Internet," a significant portion of purchasing occurs online." The
nature of the Internet and online transactions have increased the
amount of information retailers can collect about buyers and
visitors."0
Additionally, many software companies are now offering

[hereinafter VentureDirect] ("VentureDirect offers online and offline media, to
cost-effectively reach virtually every business and consumer marketplace."); see
also Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Privacy Institute for Intellectual
Property & Information Law Symposium: E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic
Privacy, 38 Hous. L. REv. 717, 723 (2001) (discussing how Acxiom offered a
customer list which identified "individuals who may speak their native language,
but do not think in that manner, but withdrew the description from their website
after receiving negative publicity.").
54. See MSS, supra note 53.
55. Polk Automotive Intelligence, availableat
http://www.polk.com/products/markets/dealers-is/target-marketing.asp
(last
visited Sept. 20, 2002).
56. See Acxiom Specialty Lists, availableat
http://www.acxiom.com/DisplayMain/0,1494,USA-en-938-976-~0-0,00.html (last
visited Sept. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Acxiom Specialty Lists].
57. See infra Part II.B.2.
58. See Frank Thorsberg, Growth in Internet Use Slows, PC WORLD.COM,
Aug. 18, 2001 (stating that "the popularity of the Internet continues to grow," but
growth will slow down in the future), availableat
http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,58043,00.asp (last visited Mar. 20,
2002).
59. See Jeremy Lieb, 1999 U.S./Canada Internet Demographic Study,
COMMERCENET, 1999-2000 (indicating that fifty-five million people were making
online purchases in 1999), available at
http://www.commerce.net/research/stats/analysis/99-USCanda-Study.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 20, 2002).
60. See Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic
Marketplace Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Technology, 106th Cong. (2000) ("[Tjechnology has enhanced the capacity of

online companies to collect, store, transfer, and analyze vast amounts of data
from and about the consumers who visit their Web sites."), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/testimonyprivacy.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2002)
[hereinafter Pitofsky testimony] (statement of Robert Pitofsky, Federal Trade
Commission); see also Wingate, supra note 13, at 897.
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products to allow Internet businesses to compile more complex
customer lists.6 Now information in the customer lists of Internet
companies includes names, addresses, phone numbers, credit card

information, shopping history, and web-surfing habits. 2

This

information can then be analyzed for patterns and trends, known

as data mining, for marketing purposes.63
Traditional customer lists were rather simple6' and were not
compiled with any obligation of privacy to those included.65
Today's lists are far more complex66 and information compiled
from Internet transactions is often obtained with promises of
privacy.67 Due to the fears of misuse of personal information on
the Internet, 68 most e-commerce sites have promised to protect the
privacy of their customers.69 Privacy policies are essential to the
61. Such software includes SmartBiz, available at http://www.fmcapgspec.com/smartbizp.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2002); MerchantReach,
available at
http://www-3.ibm.com/software/webservers/commerce/retailindustry.html
(last
visited Mar. 20, 2002); and Microsoft Great Plains Business Solutions, available at
http://www.microsoft.com/catalog/display.asp?subid=22&site=10939&x=20&y=14
(last visited Mar. 20, 2002).
62. See Davidson, supra note 12; see also Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13,
at 779; infra Part III.C.1.
63. See Joseph S. Fulda, Data Mining and Privacy, 11 ALB. L.J. SCd. & TECH.
105, 106-07 (2000). There is currently a debate on whether data mining violates
privacy rights, but whether or not it does is outside of the scope of this Note.
64. See Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 776-77 (noting that customer
lists in the past were "bare-bones" lists).
65. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (noting that new lists gathered
using technology are easier to gather and "are simply maintained, manipulated,
and transferred").
67. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
68. See Wingate, supra note 13, at 915 (citing Pitofsky testimony, supra note
60); see also Beckmann, supra note 21, at 771 ("[Ojverwhelming majorities of net
users say that privacy policies are important, or would matter to them in deciding
whether to trade information for benefits, or would increase their Internet usage,
purchases, or information disclosure."); Reidenberg, supra note 53, at 725
("[T]he Internet will never realize its full potential as a sales medium unless
consumers are assured that their transaction information will remain private.");
Beckmann, supra note 21, at 770-71.
69. See Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 780 ("Many [websites] have
posted privacy policies on their Web sites, sometimes promising not to share the
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choices made by many Internet users.7 It is because of these
changes in the nature of customer lists that they are not similarly
treated.7' The customer lists of Internet companies are simply far
more complicated, both in nature and use, than their traditional
counterparts, and these changes are significant because
information collected about customers using new methods includes
matters which they may consider to be private, such as data about
health needs, children, and financial status.72 "It is the prevalence,
ease, and relative low cost of such information collection that
distinguishes the online environment from more traditional means
of commerce and information collection and thus raises consumer
concerns." 3
B. CustomerLists in Brick & MortarBusinesses
Customer lists have existed for a long time in brick and mortar
businesses.
"For years, brick-and-mortar companies have sold
customer's personal data with any third party."); see also Beckmann, supra note
21, at 771 ("In response [to consumer concerns about privacy], Internet
companies are much more attentive to the consumer demand for privacy than
their brick-and-mortar counterparts."); Morris & Fearon, supra note 13 ("To
acquire this sensitive information, many e-tailers make privacy guarantees
promising the customer never to disclose to a third party the information they
have collected."). The TRUSTe Privacy Seal Program, an online seal program
that signifies that the site conforms to its strict privacy requirements, has over
1500 sites registered. See http://www.truste.org/users/users-lookup.html (last
visited Mar. 20, 2002). However, "[w]eb seal programs are not a substitute for
clear independent legal recourse" and "are also unlikely to cover the vast
majority of [w]eb sites." Reidenberg, supra note 53, at 727-28.
70. See Beckmann, supra note 21, at 771.
71. See infra Parts II.B-II.C.
72. See Lois R. Lupica, Financing the Enterprises of the Internet: The
Technology-Rich "Dot-Corn" in Bankruptcy, 53 ME. L. REV. 361, 376 (2001).
73.

FEDERAL TRADE

COMMISSION,

PRIVACY

ONLINE:

A

REPORT TO

CONGRESS (1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/toc.htm and
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/conclu.htm (last visited May 2, 2002).
74. See Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 778 ("For years, firms have
been licensing and selling.. .customer data both in and out of bankruptcy
without much fear of legal limitation." Customer lists have been used as
collateral for raising capital, have allowed to be licensed, and are subject to sale.);
see also Wingate, supra note 13, at 896.
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their customer lists as an asset."75 There are several reasons why
businesses would be interested in purchasing customer lists offered
for sale.76 The sale of such compiled information has been
recognized as legitimate in many federal and state courts.' These
courts have treated customer lists as trade secrets.78 Other
attempts to prohibit the disclosure of customer information by
those on lists have also failed. 9 In fact, the sale of customer
information in a traditional list has never been prohibited by a
bankruptcy court or other court. 0
1. Incentives to Buy Customer Lists
There are several reasons why one company would want to
purchase the customer list of another company. "A dot-coin's
customer list may be valuable to its competitors because it contains
information concerning buying preferences, names and ages of
children, credit card numbers, birth dates, and other information
that customers may not wish to disclose to third parties."'" Other
reasons to buy customer lists are the potential accuracy of the lists,
the fact that they are targeted to specific customers, the
opportunity to use such information for product development, and
tax incentives.
Accuracy in customer lists is valued because it eliminates
waste from incorrect contact information on such lists.82 Accuracy
also revolves around identifying the individual members of a single
household, so that each member can be individually targeted.83 On
75. Blakeley, supra note 13; see also Beckmann, supra note 21, at 776 ("In the
United States, personal information has long been bought and sold with the
assumption that it belongs to the one who compiles it.").
76. See infra Part II.B.1.
77. See infra Part II.B.2.
78. See infra Part II.B.2.
79. See infra Part II.B.3.
80. See infra Parts II.B.2-II.B.3.
81. Blakeley, supra note 13.
82. See Sheila Yount, Quantum Leap: The New Acxiom Data Network
Expands Market for Data Services, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Mar. 3, 1998, at
DI (noting that accuracy "which will reduce the amount of mail sent to the
'current occupant' or to people who previously lived at an address.").
83. See Ralph Kimball, Dealing with Dirty Data; Data Warehousing;
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the other hand, inaccuracy in customer lists can "cause serious
damage to a company, leading to bad decisions, product recalls even financial losses."' Thus it is essential to maintain or obtain an
accurate customer list to maximize the effect of marketing and
minimize losses. "The bottom line: The right information will pay
for itself."85
Another advantage of purchasing customer lists is that the lists
are targeted, which allows information to be sent to people with a
known or demonstrated interest in particular products or services. 6
Additionally, contact made from customer lists could focus on
consumers with certain demographic and behavioral characteristics
that will make them interested in the products and services
offered.' When all the members of a household are known, the
company can meet "the overall needs of the household and suggest
an effective consolidation or expansion of products."" Targeted
customer lists help to increase effectiveness and reduce losses.
Customer lists compiled by companies based on purchases
tend to be more accurate and targeted than lists that can be
purchased commercially from companies like Acxiom89 and
VentureDirect. ° Such lists are comprised of customers who have
already demonstrated an interest in a particular product or service
and a willingness to purchase online. Because of these attributes of
customer lists, it is clear that there is and will continue to be a
market for them, either as part of a merger or part of a bankruptcy
Technology Info, DBMS, Sept. 1996, at 55.
84. Linda Wilson, The Devil in Your Data-Hopingto Combine Databases?
Be Prepared to Find Inaccurate Information that Can Lead to Unhappy
Customers, Useless Reports, and FinancialLosses, INFORMATIONWEEK, Aug. 31,
1992, at 48.
85. John Rendleman, Customer Data Means Money: Businesses Are Buying
and Selling Customer Data in a Dizzying Number of Ways,
INFORMATIONWEEK.COM, Aug. 20, 2001, availableat
http://www.informationweek.com/story/IWK20010816S0008 (last visited Sept. 1,
2002).

86.
87.
88.
89.
56.
90.

See Yount, supra note 82, at D1.
See Kimball, supra note 83.
See id. (referring to this process as cross-selling).
See Acxiom, supra note 53; see also Acxiom Specialty Lists, supra note
See VentureDirect, supra note 53.
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sale.9"
Moreover, customer lists can be used for further product
"Customer knowledge can also help an
development.9 2
organization predict which sorts of services and support offerings
customers are likely to want or need, and to develop more effective
strategies for meeting these needs before they are even
articulated."93 If done properly, such product development could
build customer loyalty and develop long term relationships."
Aside from the uses of customer lists, there are tax advantages
to purchasing customer lists. "To the extent a transaction can be
structured favorably to preserve any carryforwards or minimize
any future restrictions, [it] may translate into a [b]uyer's ability to
pay more for that business."95 The fact that a purchased list can be
deducted or amortized96 for fifteen years' encourages such sales.
The amount deducted or amortized is based on the market value
price of the list, not its historical cost, thereby increasing the tax
value of the purchase.98
2. Customer Lists As Trade Secrets
While the goal of bankruptcy law, to maximize the value of the

91. For a discussion on how to value customer lists, see generally Jack
Schmid, Assigning Value to Your Customer List, CATALOG AGE, Apr. 2001.
92. See Joel P. Trachtman, Cyberspace, Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and
Modernism, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 561, 574 (1998).
93. Eric Lesser et al., Managing Customer Knowledge; Becoming 'CustomerCentric' Is Easier Said Than Done. But It Can Be Done., J. Bus. STRATEGY, Nov.
2000.
94. Will You Please Care for My Every Need, PRECISION MARKETING, June
9, 1997, at 13.
95. Tax Implications on the Sale of a Business, available at
http://www.mediamergers.com/taximplications.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2002)
[hereinafter Tax Implications].
96. Amortization is defined as "apportioning the initial cost of a usu[ally]
intangible asset, such as a patent, over the asset's useful life." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY

32 (New Pocket ed. 1996).

97. Tax Implications, supra note 95. Amortizing or deducting the value of
the customer lists implies that the lists are considered property.
98. Thomas Cuccia, Let's Make a Deal, SUCCESS, available at
http://www.fmvopinions.com/deal/htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2002).
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debtor estate,99 and the promises of privacy by Internet businesses"°
are clearly at odds, no one on a customer list has ever challenged
its sale in a bankruptcy court.'' In other proceedings, however,
customer lists have been recognized as assets of a company. Many
state and federal courts have held that customer lists are trade
secrets. 2 Forty-two states and the District of Columbia have
adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA") 3 drafted by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State

99. See supra Part I.A.
100. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
101. A recent search on Lexis produced no results.
102- See Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 787-88, 806 (stating that as
trade secrets, customer lists would be considered property and even if such lists
could be treated as contracts between the purchaser and the company compiling
the customer information, it is unlikely the trustee would assume the contract and
follow through with the agreement per 11 U.S.C. § 365 because (1) there would
be no benefit to the estate from assuming the agreement not to disclose the
information and (2) the contract between the customer and the seller need not be
considered executory, as the customer had already provided his or her
information and the seller had already provided the service or product); see also
supra note 30.
103. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.910 (2001); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 44-401 (Michie
2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-601 (Michie 2001); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426
(Deering 2001); COLO. REV .STAT. § 7-74-101 (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-50
(2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 2001 (2001); D.C. CODE ANN. § 48-501 (2001);
FLA. STAT. ch. 688.001 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-760 (2001); HAW. REV
.STAT. § 482B-1 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 48-801 (Michie 2001); 765 ILL. COMP.
STAT. § 1065/1 (2001); IND. CODE § 24-2-3-1 (2001); IOWA CODE § 550.1 (2001);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3320 (2001); KY. REv.STAT. ANN. § 365.880 (2001); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1431 (West 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1541
(West 2001); MD. CODE ANN. [COM. LAW] § 11-1201 (2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 445.1901 (2001); MINN. STAT. § 325C.01 (2001); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-26-1
(2001); Mo. REV. STAT. § 417.450 (2001); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 30-14-401 (2001);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-501 (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. § 600A.010 (2001); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-B:1 (2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3A-1 (2001); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 66-152 (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-25.1-01 (2001); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1333.61 (Anderson 2001); OKLA. STAT. tit. 78 § 85 (2001); OR.
REV. STAT. § 646.461 (2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-41-1 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. §
39-8-1 (Law. Co-op 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-29-1 (Michie 2001); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 13-24-1 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4601 (2001); VA. CODE
ANN. § 59.1-336 (Michie 2001); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.108.010 (2001); W. VA.
CODE § 47-22-1 (2001); Wis. STAT. § 134.90 (2001).
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Law." Section 1(4) of the UTSA defines trade secret as:
4) "Trade secret" means information, including a formula,
pattern, compilation, program device, method, technique, or
process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is
the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.105

"Many customers lists compiled by e-tailers are likely to fit this

definition. They derive at least part of their value from not being
the subject of reasonable
known to competitors and are usually
'1 6
secrecy.'
their
maintain
to
efforts
California"'° has adopted the UTSA"'° and has recognized that
customer lists can be sold."'° Courts have held that, "customer lists
and related information may constitute protectable [sic] trade
secrets.." Other UTSA states have reached similar conclusions."'

104. See http://www.execpc.com/-mhallign/usta.html (last visited Mar. 20,
2002).
105. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1(4) (amended 1985).
106. Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 788.
107. For the sake of brevity, California is used as an example of a state that
has adopted the UTSA.
108. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3425 (Deering 2001); see also Morlife, Inc. v.
Perry, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1514, 1520-21 (Cal. App. 1st Dep't Super. Ct. 1997);
Courtesy Temp. Serv., Inc. v. Camacho, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1278, 1286-87 (Cal.
App. 2nd Dep't Super. Ct. 1990); Am. Paper & Packaging Prods., Inc. v. Kirgan,
183 Cal. App. 3d 1318, 1322-23 (Cal. App. 2nd Dep't Super. Ct. 1986); Linda L.
Castle, Computers and High Tech, Revisited, 1 A.B.A.J. 150 (1985).
109. See, e.g., Stewart v. Telex Communications, Inc., 1 Cal. App. 4th 190, 193
(Cal. App. 3rd Dep't Super. Ct. 1991); Lundell v. Sidney Mach. Tool Co., 190
Cal. App. 3d 1546, 1553 (Cal. App. 2nd Dep't Super. Ct. 1987); Harvey v. White,
213 Cal. App. 2d 275, 276 (Cal. App. 3rd Super. Ct. 1963).
110. Gemini Aluminum Corp. v. Cal. Custom Shapes, Inc., 95 Cal. App. 4th
1249, 1263 (Cal. App. 4th Dep't Super. Ct. 2002).
111. See Richard A. Bales & Joseph S. Bums, A Survey of Kentucky
Employment Law, 28 N. KY. L. REv. 219, 269 (2001) ("[Oither states have
defined trade secrets to include customer lists."); see also Denise H. McClelland
& John L. Forgy, Is Kentucky Law "Pro-Business" in Its Protection of Trade
Secrets, Confidential and Proprietary Information? A Practical Guide for
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Seven states have recognized trade secrets under common
law."1 2 For example:
In determining whether information constitutes a trade secret,
New York' courts have considered the following factors: (1)
the extent to which the information is known outside of the
business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and
others involved in the business; (3) the extent of measures
taken by the business to guard the secrecy of the information;
(4) the value of the information to the business and its
competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by
the business in developing the information; (6) the ease or
difficulty with which the information could be properly
acquired or duplicated by others."'

Moreover, any customer list compiled through the efforts of
the business and which remains confidential is a trade secret.15 As
a result, several116courts have recognized the legitimacy of the sale of

customer lists.

Two states have drafted their own privacy provisions relating
Kentucky Businesses and Their Lawyers, 24 N. KY. L. REv. 229, 231 (1997).
112. These states are Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming. See
http://execpc.com/-mhallign/42state.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2002). For a
discussion of how trade secrets at common law were enforced under both contact
and property theories, see Milton E. Babirak, Jr., The Virginia Uniform Trade
Secrets Act: A Critical Summary of the Act and Case Law, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 15
(2000).
113. For the sake of brevity, New York will be used as an example of states
recognizing customer lists as trade secrets under common law for the sake of
brevity.
114. See N. Ati. Instruments v. Haher, 188 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing
Restatement of Torts § 757 cmt. B); see also Simplex Wire & Cable Co. v. Dulon,
Inc., 196 F. Supp. 437, 441 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); Ferranti Elec., Inc. v. Harwood, 251
N.Y.S.2d 612, 618 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964).
115. See N. Atl.Instrument, 188 F.3d at 38.
116. See, e.g., Roessel Cine Photo v. Kapsalis, No. 109251/96, 1997 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIs 299 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997); Danna Metro Heating Corp. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
203 A.D.2d 231 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994); Murphy Heating Serv., Inc. v. Chu, 124
A.D.2d 907 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986). As noted in the discussion about USTA states,
no customer on a list has ever challenged the sale of a customer list in the
bankruptcy context, so these cases have not considered privacy issues. See supra
note 109.
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to the nature of customer lists as trade secrets."7 In Alabama, lists
have been protected as trade secrets where they "have contained
specific information about customers" and "in those cases, the
information was treated by the claimant as secret." ' 8 Many
Alabama courts have recognized the legitimacy of selling customer
lists."9

Likewise, in Massachusetts, "if the person entitled to a trade
secret wishes to have its exclusive use in his own business, he must
not fail to take all proper and reasonable steps to keep it a
secret."' As such, the legitimacy of the sale of customer lists is
also recognized in that state.'2'
As the above demonstrates, all states recognize customer lists
as trade secrets under certain circumstances. Similarly, trade
secrets are protected under federal law. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
1839(3):
(3) the term "trade secret" means all forms and types of
financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or
engineering
information,
including
patterns,
plans,
compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes,
methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or
codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how

117. See ALA. CODE § 8-27-1 (2001) (effective Aug. 12, 1987); see also MASS.
GEN. LAWS. ch. 93, § 42 (2001) (effective 1967).
118. Public Sys., Inc. v. Towry, 587 So. 2d 969, 973 (Ala. 1991); see also
Birmingham Television Co. v. DeRamus, 502 So. 2d 761 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986).
119. See, e.g., Brown v. Economy Baler Co., 599 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 1992); Specialty
Container Mfg., Inc. v. Rusker Packaging Inc., 572 So. 2d 403 (Ala. 1990); James
v. Mc Coy Mfg., Co., 431 So. 2d 1147 (Ala. 1983). As mentioned in the USTA
and common law state discussions above, no one in Alabama has ever challenged
the sale of a customer list in the context of bankruptcy. See supra notes 109, 116.
120. J.T. Healy & Son, Inc. v. James A. Murphy & Son, Inc., 357 Mass. 728,
738 (1970); see also Export Lobster Co. v. Bay State Lobster Co., No. 92-6348-E,
1994 Mass. Super. LEXIS 90, at *19 (Sup. Ct. 1994); In re Yankee Milk, Inc., 372
Mass. 353, 363 (1977).
121. See, e.g., Christian Book Distribs., Inc. v. Wallace, 533 Mass. App. Ct. 905
(App. Ct. 2002); Coastal Oil New England v. Citizens Fuels Corp., 388 Mass.
App. Ct. 26 (App. Ct. 1995); Frontier Enterprises, Inc. v. Anchor Co. of
Marblehead, Inc., 404 Mass. 506 (1989). Again, no one in Massachusetts has ever
challenged the sale of a customer list because his name was included. See supra
notes 109, 116, 119.
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stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically,
graphically, photographically, or in writing if-(A) the owner
thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such
information secret; and(B) the information derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper
means by, the public.'22

Although no federal court has applied § 1839 to hold customer
lists to be trade secrets, probably because most such disagreements
fall under state contract law,'" the statute could certainly be read to
allow such an interpretation. Nonetheless, federal courts, namely

bankruptcy courts, have recognized the legitimacy of selling
customer lists. 24
Clearly, there are many reasons for a party to purchase a
customer list from another business and such sales have been
allowed nationwide, both under state law and federal law,

especially in bankruptcy cases, for traditional brick and mortar
businesses. However, as will be shown below, " such sales are
sometimes problematic for Internet businesses.
3. Other Causes of Action When Consumer Information Is
Disclosed

Individuals have tried various causes of action to prevent the
dissemination of information on customer lists.

In Dwyer v.

American Express Co., a class action suit was filed against a credit
card company for renting information about customer shopping

122. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(c) (2000).
123. Federal courts have abided by state court findings that customer lists are
trade secrets. See, e.g., U.S. v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000); N. At.
Instruments, Inc. v. Haber, 188 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 1999).
124. See, e.g., In re United States Truck Co. Holdings, No. 99-59972-WS, 2000
Bankr. LEXIS 1376 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000); Phillips v. Diecast Marketing
Innovations, No. 99-60268-T, 2000 Bankr. LExis 612 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000); In
re R & A Assoc., Inc., No. 98-365566F, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 543 (Bankr. E.D.
Penn. 1999). These cases do not include bankruptcy cases because no case
challenging the sale of a customer list has never been decided because of
dismissal or settlement. See supra notes 109, 116, 119, 121; see also infra Part III.
125. See infra Part II.C.
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preferences and habits.1 26 The plaintiffs brought both privacy and
Illinois consumer fraud claims.2 7 The court found that the privacy
claims could not be upheld because the plaintiffs could not
demonstrate intrusion or prying into their seclusion.2 8 Rather,
"[b]y using the American Express card, a cardholder is voluntarily,
and necessarily, giving information to defendants that, if analyzed,
will reveal a cardholder's spending habits and shopping
preferences... a defendant has [not] committed an unauthorized
intrusion by compiling the information voluntarily given to it and
then renting its compilation."'29 Similarly, the fraud claim was
denied because of a lack of damages, other than an excess of
mail.'3 ° As a result, the dismissal of the case was affirmed.'3 '
In a similar case in New York, a group of plaintiffs brought
suit against their credit card and mortgage holding company for
selling their information to third party vendors without their
consent or the chance to remove their names from the lists."' The
plaintiffs claimed that the defendant engaged in deceptive business
practices, received unjust enrichment, breached its contract with
the plaintiffs, and violated New York civil rights laws.'33
In the above case, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower court's dismissal of all of the charges.'34 It found that the
deceptive practices claim could not stand because the plaintiffs did
not actually suffer any injury. 5 The "class members were merely
offered products and services which they were free to decline. This

126. Dwyer v. American Express Co., 273 Ill. App. 3d 742, 743-45 (1995)
(noting that the lists were marketed based on types of specific products bought,
like fine jewelry, mail-order, or electronics, or based on the likelihood of a
customer shopping with a particular retailer, based on shopping habits and recent
purchases).
127. Id. at 744.
128. Id. at 746.

129.

Id.

130. Id. at 750.
131. Id. at 751.
132. Smith v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA, N.A., No. 2000-08199, 2002 N.Y.
App. Div. LEXIs 3790, *2-*3 (2001).
133. Id. at *2 (noting that no privacy claim was made by the plaintiffs).
134. Id. at *3.
135. Id. at *4-*6.
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does not qualify as actual harm."'' 6 The claim of unjust enrichment
was also dismissed because such a claim requires that the plaintiff
not receive adequate compensation for a benefit conferred upon
the defendant.'37 "The plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action to
recover damages for unjust enrichment since the members of the
plaintiffs' class who made purchases of products and/or services
received a benefit" - the product purchased.3 ' Likewise, the
breach of contract claim failed because the damages claimed were
vague and redress for emotional distress is not available through a
breach of contract allegation. 39' Finally, the civil rights claims were
disallowed because those statutes were not intended to resolve
140
issues such as the ones in this case.
C. Customer Lists in E-Commerce
1. How Information Is Collected on the Internet
"[T]he technological developments that have made ecommerce possible also have enhanced the ability of companies to
collect, store, transfer, and analyze vast amounts of data from and
about the consumers who visit their sites on the World Wide
Web.' 141
Unlike the traditional collection of transactional
information in the brick and mortar realm,' 2 data on the Internet is
essentially collected in two different ways: (1) by compiling
information provided by the user during a transaction or survey;
and (2) by accessing information about a user without her
knowledge or consent.' 3

136. Id. at *5.
137. Id. at *6.
138. Id.
139. Id. at *7.
140. Id. at *7-*8 (providing no further explanation, the court merely stated
"[t]he plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action under Civil Rights Law §§ 50
and 51. Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51, which must be narrowly construed, were
never intended to address the wrongs complained of by the plaintiffs.").
141. Wingate, supra note 13, at 897 (quoting the Federal Trade Commission).
142. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
143. See Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 784.
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a. User-ProvidedInformation
User-provided information is exactly what it sounds like: data
compiled based on information customers give to the party running
the Internet site."' For example, when placing an order on
Amazon.com, the company requires the name of the purchaser,
her billing address, a separate shipping address (if applicable), her
phone number, her credit card number and its expiration date, and
her email address.145 Likewise, to set up an email account on
Yahoo!, the user is asked to provide her name, date of birth,
current email address (optional), zip code, gender, profession, job
title, professional area of specialty, and can fill out an optional
survey on his or her interests.' 6
Additionally, an Internet user may be asked to provide
additional information in a survey,' 7 brought up as a separate
window, after a transaction has been completed, or as an attempt
to provide further services to a user, such as recommending other
purchases.
b. Accessing User Information
Other information about Internet users is collected through
clickstream data, cookies, and web bugs. Clickstream data,
essentially determining what sites the user came from, is collected
by the website visited, recording ,"the Internet service provider, the
type of computer and software used, the website linked from, the
amount of time spent perusing each page, and exactly what parts of
the website were explored and for how long."'4 8 The visited
144.
145.

See id. at 784.
See
generally

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/account-access-

login/ref=hyjf_2/002-6570095-1914453 (last visited Mar. 20, 2002).
146. See
http://edit.yahoo.com/config/eval-register?.intl=&new=l&.done=&.src=ym&part
ner=&promo=&.last= (last visited Mar. 20, 2002).
147. See id.
148.

Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors

for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1393, 1411 (2001); see also Suzanne M.
Thompson, The DigitalExplosion Comes with a Cost, 4 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 3, 8
n.7 (1999) (finding that clickstream data is compiled by "a series of electronic
markers (trail) at each website or page generated by a user's browsing activities,
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website then "collects information about the way [the] user
interacts with the site and stores the information in its database"
and uses this information to target advertisements and products to
the user.' 9
More and more companies are accessing clickstream data for
direct marketing and targeted advertising purposes."
Such
information can be obtained, stored, and used and reused at the
leisure of the collecting entity.' Moreover, "[t]his aggregation of
data is particularly telling if done by a site host of an Internet
search engine (e.g., Yahoo!). The search engine site can monitor
both the type of information that a user is seeking (patterns of
research) and the web sites visited to obtain that information."'52
Similarly, cookies are small code files placed on computers
when a user first visits a particular website and which update
information about the user each time the user returns to that
website. 3 Once a cookie is placed on a computer, it facilitates the
transmission of the users clickstream data to the website
operator."' One of the purposes of a cookie is to identify which
ads a customer sees, which of those ads the customer actually
responds to by clicking on it, and which items the customer actually
places in her virtual shopping cart.'5

including every page of access, newsgroups participated in, distribution lists

received, e-mail addresses sent and received.").
149. Solove, supra note 148, at 1411.
150. See Gavin Skok, Establishing a Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in
Clickstream Data, 6 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 61, 65 (1999/2000). For an

argument that clickstream data should be subject to privacy provisions, see id.
151. See Myrna L. Wigod, Privacy in Public and Private E-Mail and On-Line
Systems, 19 PACE L. REV. 95, 100 (1998).
152 Id.
153. Wingate, supra note 13, at 898. Actually, since the website can only
identify the computer and not the actual user, the information collected is specific
to the computer which the file is placed on, and not the actual user. Nonetheless,

given that many computers are primarily used by one individual (such as an
office computer) or by a single household, the information is still meaningful to
those collecting it.
154. See Lawrence Jenab, Will the Cookie Crumble?: An Analysis of Internet
Privacy Regulatory Schemes Proposed in the 106 Congress, 49 KAN. L. REV. 641,

645-46 (2001).
155.

See Wingate, supra note 13, at 898 (identifying this purpose as state
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Cookies also ascertain whether a user has recently visited the
site."' This data helps determine how much an advertiser should
compensate the website operator for exposing individual visitors to
its ads so that the advertiser compensates for exposing a single user
to an ad. This prevents an advertiser from compensating per
visitor, as the same visitor may return to the cite several times.157
However, one of the most significant purposes of cookies is to
collect information about users for marketing.'58 This practice,
known as online profiling, uses clickstream data to collect and
convey information about user preferences based on the websites
the user visits.'59 While this information may not be able to directly
identify the user, it can ultimately be linked up with identifiable
data, thereby revealing the interests and needs of specific people."6
"By linking the online profiles to personally identifying
information, the databases can then be used to narrowly tailor
advertisements to individual consumers6 based on what had
previously been anonymous web-surfing.' 1
Companies such as Doubleclick 1 2 create a network of websites
that track user information between sites, so that the company can
"compile a database of detailed information about the users, their
personalized
[I]nternet surfing habits and perhaps even
13
websites.'
to
provided
have
information the users
In addition to cookies, Internet sites also use web bugs to
gather information. "A Web bug is a graphic on a [W]eb page or
in an [e]mail message that is designed to monitor who is reading
the Web page or Email message ... [they] are often invisible
because they are typically only 1-by-1 pixel in size."" Web bugs

management).
156.

See Wingate, supra note 13, at 899.

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See id. at 898.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 899-900.
See id. at 900.
See generally,http://www.doubleclick.com/us/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).

163. Wingate, supra note 13, at 899 (quoting Seth R. Lesser, Privacy Law in
the Internet Era: New Developments and Directions,PRACTICING LAW INST., June
2000, at 141, 144).
164. See Richard M. Smith, FAQ: Web Bugs, Privacy Foundation, availableat
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transmit information such as the IP address of the user's computer,
the URL of the page the web bug is place on, the URL of the
actual bug, the time the bug was viewed, the type of browser the
visitor is using, and any relevant cookie data on the user's
computer.'65 Web bugs serve several purposes: (1) to build a profile
about the user based on sites she has visited; (2) to determine how
many users have visited a certain website; (3) to determine which
web browsers are used more often at specific sites; (4) in the case
of email, to determine how often messages are actually read and
forwarded, as opposed to deleted or ignored; and (5) when placed
in an email, to ease identification of the email recipient when she
visits the sender's website.'66
Clearly, clickstream data, cookies, and web bugs all generate
and obtain great amounts of information, which can easily be
matched up with real people to determine whether John Jones has
visited the Viagra website or whether Mary Smith has looked up
potty training and purchased toys for a one year old female child.67
Anonymity can be easily compromised, given the amount of
information collected and the number of parties collecting such
information.'
What is worse is that most users are unaware that
this additional information is being collected.'69 Almost thirty
percent of Internet users are not aware of the existence of cookies,
and forty percent of people online do not know how to deactivate
them.170
As the above illustrates, customer lists in the e-commerce
context contain far more information than traditional customer

http://www.privacyfoundation.org/resources/webbug.asp (last visited Mar. 22,
2002).
165. See id.; see also Jenab, supra note 154, at 645 n.20.
166. See Smith, supra note 164.
167. See ONLINE PROFILING: A REPORT TO CONGRESS-PART 2
RECOMMENDATIONS, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, July 2000, at 3 ("[I]n some
cases, the profiles derived from tracking customers' activities on the Web are
linked or merged with personally identifiable information."), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/200O/07/onlineprofiling.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
168. See Wingate, supra note 13, at 800.
169. See Jenab, supra note 154, at 647.
170. See Reidenberg, E-Commerce, supra note 53, at 730 (citing the results of
an online Wall Street Journal and Harris Interactive study).
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lists compiled by brick-and-mortar businesses. 7' Moreover, much
of the information is collected without the knowledge of
customers,'72 who may simply believe that the information collected
about them is solely the information they provided.
2. Laws Protecting E-Commerce Consumers
There have been several statutes passed to protect Internet
users;73 however, none of these have directly addressed the
collection of data without customer knowledge or the transfer of
such information. What follows is a brief explanation of the
Internet user protection statutes that have been passed, followed
by a discussion of how these laws do not adequately address the
issue of data collection or sale of such information.
a. The Computer Fraudand Abuse Act
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") is aimed at
anyone who "intentionally accesses a computer without
authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains
information from any protected computer if the conduct involved
an interstate or foreign communication."'7
"It is reasonable to
interpret this statute as prohibiting the covert, unauthorized
collection of personal information of web-users while they are
engaged in the acts of interstate or foreign commerce or
communication."' 75
However, CFAA has a $5,000 minimum
damage requirement, during any single year, in civil actions.'76
Because most personal information cannot meet the threshold
damages requirement, collection of personal data is not generally

171.

See supra Part II.A.

172.
173.
174.
175.

See Jenab, supra note 154, at 647.
See Wingate, supra note 13, at 900.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2000).
Wingate, supra note 13, at 901.

176.

See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8) (2000).

177. See Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 786 ("Neither state nor federal
law accords a person an exclusive right in his or her name, address or phone
number."). For a discussion on the difficulty of valuing such personal
information, see id. at 802 and n.123.
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prosecuted under CFAA. Nonetheless, theoretically, CFAA could
be used to prosecute the collection of information using
clickstream data, cookies, and web bugs,'7' but to date, it has not
been successfully used in such a manner.
A CFAA claim of this nature was brought against Doubleclick
in January 2000.2"9

Identical claims were consolidated for the

purposes of class action in May, 2000, with two other actions
combined by September.'
The Doubleclick Court found "that
damages and losses under § 1030(e)(8)(A) may only be aggregated
across victims and over time for a single act," based on the use of
singular, instead of plural, terms in the statute and based on
legislative intent."' Therefore, because the plaintiffs could easily
modify their browser settings to prevent Doubleclick from planting
cookies on their computers and because no actual economic
damage to computers or data was pleaded by the plaintiffs, the
claim was dismissed. 82
. The Doubleclick holding was used in Avenue A,
where the
court dismissed the CFAA action because "it is undisputed that
each time a web page sends a message to a user's computer
instructing the computer to communicate the contents of the
cookie on the user's hard drive with Avenue A, it is an individual,
singular act."' 83 The Avenue A Court found that each individual

access to a cookie did not result in $5,000 of damage and,
therefore, dismissed the action.l" Other courts have found the
threshold damage amount is not met in CFAA cases alleging
178. See Fernando Piera, International Electronic Commerce Legal
Framework at the Beginning of the XXI Century, 10 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J.
8, 13-14 (2001); see also News, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 24, 2001, at A19 ("Until last year
[2000], all reported CFFA civil cases involved lawsuits brought for damage to
computer-stored data that affected either unsuspecting consumers who allegedly
were deliberately provided with defective computer goods... or Internet
companies whose facilities were used to send unsolicited junk e-mail, known as
spam.").
179. See In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 523.
182. Id. at 524-26.
183. Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1159 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
184. Id. at 1160.
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improper use of cookies. 85'
A CFAA claim was also brought in a civil class action against
Toys R Us.' 6 There, the CFAA claim survived a summary
judgment motion, where the court found that the act of placing
identical cookies on the machines of all class action plaintiffs
constituted a single act'87 and that the aggregation of damages met
the $5,000 threshold.'88 However, the final decision in the case is
still pending.
b. The Electronic CommunicationsPrivacyAct
Another statute that could prevent the collection of data
without user knowledge is the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act ("ECPA"), which states that "any person who intentionally
intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to
intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic
communication" is subject to civil or criminal liability.'88 The
"ECPA could serve as an existing statutory prohibition on the
covert collection of personal consumer information" by alleging
that cookies are bugs, such as phone taps, and are considered
spying."9 However, ECPA included exceptions where one of the

185.

See, e.g., In re Am. Online, Inc. Version 5.0 Software Litig., 168 F. Supp.

2d 1359, 1374-75 (S.D. Fla. 2001); In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272,
1281 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (noting that loss means irreparable damage). However, the
Intuit court did find that the intentional placement of a cookie on a user's
computer satisfied the scienter requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 1030. In re Intuit, 138
F. Supp. 2d at 1280.
186. See In re Toys R Us, Inc. Privacy Litig., No. M-00-1381, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16947 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
187. Using Doubleclick as precedent, the Toys R Us Court held that §
1030(e)(8)(A) requires "loss aggregating at least $ 5,000 in value during any 1year period to one or more individuals," to be caused from a single act. In re
Toys R Us, Inc. Privacy Litig., No. M-00-1381, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16949, at
*34 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
188. See In re Toys R Us, Inc. Privacy Litig., 2001 U.S. Dist. LExis 16949, at
*28-*39.
189. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(a) (2000).
190. See Wingate, supra note 13, at 902; see also Adam R. Fox, E-Commerce
in the Digital Millenium: The LegalNotion of a Constitutional Moment, 27
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 267,290 n.97 (2001).
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parties to a communication intercepts the message or data or if
prior consent is given for such interception.19' "Presumably the
statute's exceptions permitting interception and disclosure by
'parties to the communication' exempt the collection, analysis, and
disclosure of clickstream data by websites. '' In No action has yet
been brought under § 2511(a) of ECPA.
In Doubleclick, there was an ECPA Title II claim,' 3 under the
Stored Electronic Communications Act, which is aimed at anyone
who (1) "intentionally accesses without authorization a facility
through which an electronic information service is provided; or (2)
intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and
thereby obtains.., access to a wire or electronic communication
while it is in electronic storage in such system shall be
punished. . . .""' The plaintiffs claimed that the placement of
cookies constituted "access without authorization," but like § 2511,
there is an exception "with respect to conduct authorized.., by a
user of that [wire or electronic communications] service with
respect to a communication of or intended for that user."'9 5
Doubleclick argued that its affiliates are Internet users and that all
accessed communications were intended for these sites.'96 The
court held that "the cookie identification numbers sent to
DoubleClick from plaintiffs' computers fall outside of Title II's
protection because they are not in 'electronic storage' and, even if
they were, DoubleClick is authorized to access its own
communications." The Avenue A and Toys R Us courts relied on
191.

See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).

192. Scott Killingsworth, Minding Your Own Business: Privacy Policies in
Principleand in Practice,7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 57, 75 (1999).
193. In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 507 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
194. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
195. Doubledlick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(2)).

196.

Id.

197. Id. at 513-14. The remaining claims were settled on April 29, 2002. Press
Release, Doubleclick, Inc., Doubleclick and Plaintiffs Agree to Settle Class
2002),
available
at
Litigation
(Mar.
29,
Action
Privacy

http://www.doubleclick.com/us/corporate/presskit/pressreleases.asp?asp-object-l=&press%5Frelease%5Fid=2584 (last visited May 1,
2002). Doubleclick agreed to post a clear privacy policy, to use information
collected in a manner consistent with that policy, give consumers the opportunity
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this holding for dismissing the Title II ECPA claims in those
198

cases.

c.

The Federal Trade Commission Act

What has been most successful in the protection of consumer
data has been the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTCA"), a
statute passed well before the advent of Internet technology. 9
Pursuant to the FTCA, the FTC is empowered to prevent "unfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby
declared unlawful."2" This broadly worded statute allows the FTC
to bring actions against the sale of customer lists compiled while
under a privacy commitment. 20 '
An action under the 15 U.S.C. § 45 can be based on any
misrepresentation that induces a customer to opt to deal with a

to opt-in before information collected would be matched to personally
identifiable information, undertake a consumer education effort, to regularly
purge consumer information that is collected, and limit the life of cookies placed
on computers to five years. Id.
198. See Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1162 (W.D. Wash.
Sept. 14, 2001) ("[W]eb sites are users of the electronic communication service
provided, as Plaintiffs allege, by personal computers accessing the Internet, and
Avenue A's alleged access of the communications between personal computers
and web sites is authorized by the web sites."); see also In re Toys R Us, Inc.
Privacy Litig., No. M-00-1381, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16949, *6-*14 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 9, 2001).
199. See Barbara Crutchfield George, et al., U.S. Multinational Employers:
Navigating Through the 'Safe Harbor" Principles to Comply With the EU Data
Privacy Directive, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 735, 777 (2001) (noting that the FTCA was
enacted in 1914).
200. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2000).
[I]f it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof
would be to the interest of the public, it shall issue and serve upon such person,
partnership, or corporation a complaint stating its charges in that respect and
containing a notice of a hearing upon a day and at a place therein fixed at least
thirty days after the service of said complaint.
Id. § 45(b).
201. See infra Part III.A; see also FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374,
384 (1965) ("[T]he Commission is often in a better position than are courts to
determine when a practice is 'deceptive' within the meaning of the [FTC] Act.").
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specific company.2" The deception need not result in any injury:
"[d]eception itself is the evil the statute is designed to prevent."2' 3
"A good society depends upon promises being kept. And
individuals in society have a right to be told the truth so that their
choices among products, or, as in this case, among offers, can be
2 ' "All that is required is a showing that
understandingly made.""
the acts and practices were capable of being interpreted in a
misleading way. Testimony of consumers that they were mislead is
sufficient to sustain a prima facie case of unfair and deceptive trade
practices. 2 °5
The FTC first brought its first privacy action against
GeoCities. °6 In its complaint, the FTC alleged that "[GeoCities]
has also sold, rented, or otherwise marketed or disclosed this
information, including information collected from children, to third
parties who have used this information for purposes other than
2 7 Hence, the
those for which members have given permission.""
dissemination of information rendered the privacy provisions false
or misleading. °"
GeoCities opted to settle the case and agreed to update and
clarify its privacy policy to accurately indicate how the collected
information would actually be used. 9
The order would require the company to post on its site a clear
and prominent Privacy Notice, telling consumers what
information is being collected and for what purpose, to whom it
will be disclosed, and how consumers can access and remove

202.

See Colgate-Palmolive,380 U.S. at 386.

203.

See Floersheim v. FTC, 411 F.2d 874, 878 (9th Cir. 1969) (citing Colgate-

Palmolive).

204. Spiegel Inc. v. FTC, 494 F.2d 59, 63 (7th Cir. 1974).
205. Beckmann, supra note 21, at 775.
206. See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Internet Site Agrees to
Settle FTC Charges of Deceptively Collecting Personal Information in Agency's
First Internet Privacy Case (Aug. 13, 1998), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/9808/geocitie.htm (last visited May 1, 2002); see also

Complaint, In re Geocities (FTC 1998) (No. 982-3015), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9808/geo-cmpl.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2002).
207. See Complaint, supra note 206, 14.
208. See id. 16; see also Wingate, supra note 13, at 908.
209. See FTC Release, supra note 206; see also Wingate, supra note 13, at 909.
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the information. The Notice, or a clear and prominent
hyperlink to the Notice, would have to appear on the Web site's
home page and at each location on the site at which such
information is collected.

The order also would prohibit GeoCities from misrepresenting
either the identity of a party collecting any personal identifying
information or the sponsorship of any activity on its Web site."'

Because of the settlement of GeoCities and other similar cases,
no court has ever been confronted with whether or not the FTC's
interpretation of its power under § 45 is proper.
The privacy promises of many websites are problematic when
it comes to the sale of Internet company customer lists.
Furthermore, much of the information in such lists may not even
be compiled with the knowledge or permission of the customer.
The claims of privacy and the sensitive nature of the information,
which is far more detailed than information in traditional customer
lists, could eventually be used to bar any such sale.
While brick and mortar companies have traditionally been
able to sell their customer lists, the privacy promises and additional
information included in such lists may complicate the sale of
similar lists for Internet businesses.
As the following section
discusses, the sale of e-commerce customer lists has in fact been
problematic because of the reasons outlined above.

III. CONFLICT-BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
The conflict between the goals of bankruptcy law and privacy
promises came to a head in the now famous Toysmart.com case."'
"[O]ften [customer information] can't be sold because of privacy
concerns," despite its great value to creditors."2 As a result of the
great amount of publicity following that case, other Internet

210. Wingate, supra note 13, at 909.
211. See infra Part III.A.
212. Weintraub, supra note 13, at 914 (noting, however, "if a bankrupt dotcom acquired personal consumer data without posting a privacy policy, the
bankruptcy trustee is obliged to sell the consumer database in order to maximize
the liquidation value of the estate.").
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companies have dealt with the problem in several ways." 3
A. Toysmart.com- The Beginning of the Problem
Toysmart.com ("Toysmart") had great potential.

It was

21 5
significantly backed by The Walt Disney Company ("Disney"),
which owned a sixty percent stake in the company,2 1' 6 and was

among one of the most visited websites during the 1999 Christmas
7
2

season.

1

As a retailer of children's educational toys,218 the information
Toysmart received about its customers included names, addresses,
billing information, purchasing preferences, and information on the
children for whom the purchases were made.21 9 This information
was considered quite sensitive, as it embraced both financial
information and information about children.
By June 2000,
Toysmart had information on over 250,000 customers.'
Like
many other web retailers, Toysmart promised not to share its
213. See infra Parts III.B-III.E.
214. See Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 790 (noting that Toysmart
"initially attracted considerable attention and financing"); see also Beckmann,
supra note 21, at 766 (citing magazines such as U.S. News & World Report, Time,
and Parents as finding Toysmart among the best online toy retailers).
215. See Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 790; see also Wingate, supra
note 13, at 910.
216. See Linda Rosencrance, Toysmart Customers Still In Limbo: States Object
to Bankruptcy Settlement that Permits Transfer of Company's Customer List,
PCWORLD.COM, Aug. 4, 2000, availableat
http://www.pcworld.com/news/article.asp?aid=17944 (last visited Mar. 25, 2002);
see also Joel R. Reidenberg, The Toysmart Bankruptcy, 23d International
Conference of Data Protection Commissioners, Paris (Sept. 24, 2001), availableat
http://www.cnil.fr/conference2001/eng/contribution/reidenbergl-contrib.pdf (last
visited Sept. 26, 2002).
217. See Rosencrance, supra note 216; see also Miller & O'Rourke, supra note
13, at 790; Reidenberg, supra note 216.
218. See Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 790; see also Wingate, supra
note 13, at 910.
219. See Beckmann, supra note 21, at 766; see also Reidenberg, Toysmart,
supra note 216; Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 792; Jones & Evans, supra
note 51; Wingate, supra note 13, at 910.
220. See Jones & Evans, supra note 51.
221. See Reidenberg, supra note 216; see also Beckmann, supra note 21, at 766.
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information:222
(1) "Personal information voluntarily submitted by visitors to
our site, such as name, address, billing information and
shopping preferences, is never shared with a third party. All
information obtained by Toysmart.com is used only to
personalize your experience online;" and (2) "When you
register with toysmart.com, you can rest assured2 3that your
information will never be shared with a third party.

Toysmart also became a member of TRUSTe... in September
1999.225

However, by 2000, Toysmart had hit upon hard times6 and
ceased operations as of May 19, 2000.77 Only three days later, May
22, the company started seeking buyers for its assets.229 Shortly
thereafter, on June 8, 2000, Toysmart placed an advertisement in
the Wall Street Journal to sell its assets, including its customer list. 9
222. See Davidson, supra note 12; see also Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13,
at 792; Beckmann, supra note 21, at 767.
223. Complaint,
8, FTC v. Toysmart.com, L.L.C. (D.C. Mass. 2000),
available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2OO0/07/toysmartcmp.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2002)
(quoting the Toysmart privacy policy from its website).
224. See generally supra note 69 (discussing TRUSTe).
225. See Complaint, 8, Toysmart; see also Blakeley, supra note 13; Wingate,
supra 13, at 910; accord Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 794
226. See Wingate, supra note 13, at 766 (explaining how Toysmart's 2000
Christmas sales failed to meet expectations and how the company was running
out of operating capital and could not raise the necessary funds through an initial
public offering because of the failing stock prices of Internet businesses in early
2000); see also Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 790-91 (describing how
Disney's change in strategy to focus on "entertainment and leisure products" and
Toysmart's inability to raise additional funds because of investor fears resulted in
Toysmart's downfall).
227. See Complaint, T 10, Toysmart; see also Miller & O'Rourke, supra note
13, at 791; Beckmann, supra note 21, at 766.
228. See Complaint, 11, Toysmart; see also Jones & Evans, supra note 51;
Davidson, supra note 12.
229. See Keith Dawson, FTC to Toysmart: Define 'Never,' INDUS. STANDARD
MAG., July 11, 2000, available at
http://www.technologyfront.com/journalism/2000/07/11.html (last visited Mar. 26,
2002); see also Davidson, supra note 12; Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at
792; Morris & Fearon, supra note 13; Beckmann, supra note 21, at 767.
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The next day, June 9, 2000, Toysmart's creditors filed an
involuntary bankruptcy petition.
The sale of the customer list proved to be problematic because
3
it would result in a violation of Toysmart's posted privacy policy. '
Upon learning of the sale of the Toysmart customer list, the FTC
filed suit under 15 U.S.C. § 45 on July 10, 2000, in the District

Court of Massachusetts to prevent the sale.232 Forty-four State
Attorneys General also opposed the sale for similar reasons."
However, the FTC and Toysmart settled the case, prohibiting the

sale of the customer list "as a stand-alone asset." 4 "The
settlement only allows a sale of such lists as a package which
includes the entire Web site, and only to a 'Qualified Buyer'-an
entity that is in a related market and that expressly agrees to be

Toysmart's successor-in-interest as to the customer information."'' "
"Toysmart believed that its customer list was worth millions of dollars."
Blakeley, supra note 13.
230. See Complaint, $ 12, Toysmart; see also Miller & O'Rourke, supra note
13, at 791; Reidenberg, supra note 216; Beckmann, supra note 21, at 766.
231. See Reidenberg, supra note 216.
232. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Announces Settlement
with Bankrupt Website, Toysmart.com, Regarding Alleged Privacy Policy
Violations
(July
21,
2000),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/toysmart2.thm
(last visited Jan. 24, 2002)
[hereinafter FTC Release II]; see also Toysmart Complaint; Jones & Evans, supra
note 51; Reidenberg, supra note 216; Beckmann, supra note 21, at 767; Miller &
O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 792-93; Blakeley, supra note 13; Wingate, supra note
13, at 910. Notably, the FTC would not have been able to step in if Toysmart did
not have a privacy policy. Accord Davidson, supra note 12.
233. See Reidenberg, supra note 216; see also Miller & O'Rourke, supra note
13, at 792; Morris & Fearon, supra note 13; Blakeley, supra note 13.
234. FTC Release II, supra note 232; see also Miller & O'Rourke, supra note
13, at 793; Beckmann, supra note 21, at 767. At least one person believes that by
settling with Toysmart, "the FTC has demonstrated that it remains unsure of its
preferred legal standard." Wingate, supra note 13, at 908.
235. See FTC Release II, supra note 232; see also Reidenberg, supra note 216
("Essentially, the term [Qualified Buyer] was defined as a company in the same
type of business.. .that would agree to Toysmart's commitments for the
treatment of the personal information."); Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at
793; Davidson, supra note 12; Wingate, supra note 13, at 911; Beckmann, supra
note 21, at 766; Blakeley, supra note 13 (stating that "[tihe creditors' committee
of Toysmart objected to the settlement... complaining that the settlement would
chill bidding."); Beckmann, supra note 21, at 769 (noting that Toysmart creditors
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According to the settlement, the Qualified Buyer has to either
follow the Toysmart privacy policy or provide notice and obtain
permission from each of the persons on the list if the buyer were to
change the terms outlined in the Toysmart privacy statement.36
The settlement also required Toysmart to destroy the list if a
Qualified Buyer did not come forward.237
Not all FTC officials were satisfied by the settlement. Two
FTC Commissioners voted against the settlement. " In a dissenting
statement, Commissioner Orson Swindle stated:
I do not think that the Commission should allow the sale. If we
really believe that consumers attach great value to the privacy
of their personal information and that consumers should be
able to limit access to such information through private
agreements with businesses, we should compel businesses to
honor the promises they make to consumers to gain access to
this information. Toysmart promised its customers that their
personal information would never be sold to a third party, but
the Bankruptcy Order in fact would allow a sale to a third
party. In my view, such a sale should not be permitted because
"never" really means never.239

Similarly, Commissioner Sheila F. Anthony stated:
To accept the bankruptcy settlement would place business
concerns ahead of consumer privacy. Although the proposed
settlement's definition of a qualified buyer attempts to ensure
that only an entity "similar" to Toysmart is eligible to purchase
the list, I do not believe that this limitation is an adequate proxy
for consumer privacy interests. In my view, consumer privacy
would be better protected by requiring that consumers
themselves be given notice and choice before their detailed
personal information is shared with or used by another

objected to the settlement with the FTC because it would limit their abilities to
maximize the value of the assets because no buyer had been located).
236. See generally sources cited supra note 235.
237. See generally sources cited supra note 235.
238. FTC Release II, supra note 232; see also Miller & O'Rourke, supra note
13, at 793-94; Wingate, supra note 13, at 911-12.
239. Orson Swindle, Dissenting Statement, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2O0O/07/toysmartswindlestatement.htm (last visited Mar.
25, 2002) (emphasis in original).

310

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VIII
FINANCIAL LAW
corporate entity - especially where, as here, consumers
provided that information pursuant to a promise not to transfer
it.

240

Despite the agreement between the FTC and Toysmart, fortysix attorneys general" opposed the settlement because it violated
the consumer protection laws of their respective states and did not
give consumers the option to opt-in.242 New York and Texas filed
separate objections. 3 The states had jurisdiction because "the
privacy promise extended to consumers within each of the
respective states."2"
The settlement and the states' objections to the settlement
proved to be irrelevant, as the bankruptcy court refused to accept
the settlement proposal.'
"Under the terms of [the] ruling, any
240. Sheila F. Anthony, Dissenting Statement, availableat
http://www.ftc.gov/os/20OO/O7/toysmartanthonystatement.htm (last visited Mar.
25, 2002).
241.
These states and territories were: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, the
Northern Mariana Islands, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Virginia,
West Virginia, 'Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Objection, In re Toysmart.com
LLP, (D.C. Mass. 2000), available at
http://www.ago.state.ma.us/oppositi.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2002).
242. See Reidenberg, supra note 216.
One solution proposed by the state attorney generals in Toysmart.com was to
allow debtors to sell their customer lists encumbered by privacy guarantees on
e-mail notice to all potentially affected customers and effect consent by such
customers, i.e., on an "opt-in" basis. E-mail notice, in a form approved by the
bankruptcy court, would not only provide each customer with information
regarding a change in circumstance or a change in the original contract it
entered with the dot-coin, but would also comport with due process
requirements that notice be given to any party having an interest in property
being sold ...[e]-mail consent by consumers on an opt-in basis allows the
customer to assent to the sale and to enter a new contract at their choosing with
the debtor or its successor.
Morris & Fearon, supra note 13; see also Beckmann, supra note 21, at 768-69.
243. See Rosencrance, supra note 216.
244. See Reidenberg, supra note 216.
245. See Gary H. Anthes, Toysmart, FTC Overruled on Sale of Customer Data,
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specific offer to sell the data [would] have to go back to the court
for approval. 22 The court ultimately did not have to evaluate any
buyer for the customer list as Toysmart withdrew it from sale due
to low bids247 and the great public outcry. 8 Instead, the customer
list was purchased by Disney for $50,000, with the understanding
that the list was to be destroyed.4 9
20
The FTC is still actively watching the sale of customer lists.
According to one FTC official, "In deciding Whether to block a
data sale, the FTC- and state attorneys general who also monitor
these situations-consider a number of factors: Is the data being
sold to a company in a similar business? Is it being sold as a standalone list or is it part of a broader asset sale? What information is
being sold?, 251' However, the FTC has yet to determine a definitive
set of rules about whether to block the sale of customer lists
Nonetheless, "in the
because of privacy considerations. 2
[Toysmart] case, the FTC established a possible framework for
to
transferring otherwise confidential customer '' information
3
2
successor-in-interest under certain circumstances.
Aug. 17, 2000, available at
http://www.computerworld.com/cwi/story/0,1199,NAV47_ST048699,00.html (last
visited Sept. 26, 2002); see also Reidenberg, supra note 216; Morris & Fearon,
supra note 13; Blakeley, supra note 13; Beckmann, supra note 21, at 769-70.
246. See Reidenberg, supra note 216.
247. See Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 794. There were rumors,
however, that at least one party was willing to pay up to $100,000 for the
customer list. See Reidenberg, supra note 216.
248. See Reidenberg, supra note 216.
249. See id.; see also Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 794; Blakeley, supra
note 13; Davidson, supra note 12.
250. See Troy Wolverton, Egghead Sale Could Crack on Privacy Issue, CNET
NEWS.COM, Aug. 24, 2001, available at http://news.com.com/2100-1017272130.html?legacy=cnet (last visited Jan. 24, 2002).
251. Joelle Tessler, Bankrupt Dot-corns Ask to Sell User Data,
SILICONVALLEY.COM, Oct. 28, 2001 (citing the statements of Joel Winston, then
FTC Acting Associate Director for Financial Practices), availableat
http://www.siliconvalley.com/docs/news/depth/list102901.htm (last visited Jan. 24,
2002).
252. See Wingate, supra note 13, at 912 ("Evidently, the FTC has not
conclusively determined what must be done when a bankrupt e-business attempts
to sell personal consumer information in violation of its own privacy policy.").
253. Id. at 911.
COMPUTERWORLD,
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Toysmart demonstrates that the lack of specific consumer
privacy legislation has not barred the enforcement of privacy
policies. Rather, "despite the lack of general privacy legislation in
the United States, the case illustrates that in exceptional
circumstances other consumer protection statutes [namely 15
U.S.C. § 45], may be available to assure the fair treatment of
personal information.125 4 The public interest in this area and the
regulatory powers vested in the FTC have been enough to curtail
privacy abuses, despite the lack of court affirmation of the FTC's
interpretation of its authority.25 5
In addition, Toysmart has demonstrated of the strong public
interest in the subject of consumer privacy protection, specifically
on the part of state governments. 2" The fact that almost all states
objected to the sale of the Toysmart customer list z" suggests that
the concern about consumer privacy is nationwide. "Without the
aggressive pursuit of the case by the coalition of states.., the
outcome is likely to have been quite different"" as the extent of
coordination and cooperation necessary to prevent the sale may
not have existed.259
As a result of the Toysmart case, many other Internet retailers
have opted to treat their customer lists differently in bankruptcy.
Still others that remain
in business have altered their privacy
2 1
provisions accordingly.

254. Reidenberg, supra note 216; see also FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380
U.S. 374, 384 (1965) ("This statutory scheme [proscribed by 15 U.S.C. § 45] gives
the Commission an influential role in interpreting § 5 [of the FTCA] and in
applying it to the facts of particular cases arising out of unprecedented
situations.").
255. See supra note 201 (noting that the Colgate-Palmolive Court
acknowledged that the FTC is in a better position to determine whether an
activity is deceptive or not).
256. See Reidenberg, supra note 216.
257. See supra notes 233, 242-43 and accompanying text.
258. See Reidenberg, supra note 216.
259. See id. (noting that the coordination and cooperation necessary may not
be "easy to maintain in future cases").
260. See infra Parts III.B-III.D.
261. See infra Part IIII.E.
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B. No Sale
When Craftshop.com filed for bankruptcy in May 2000,262 the
company tried to sell its customer list. 263 However, the company
was challenged by the Texas Attorney General's Office,2" and
opted not to sell the list because the cost of litigating for the right
to sell it was higher than the price the list would fetch.265 As a
result, consumer confidentiality was protect'ed and privacy
promises were kept, but the value of the bankruptcy estate was
decreased by the decision not to sell the customer list. This
decision was disadvantageous to Craftshop's creditors and
investors and only considered their interests to the extent that the
cost of the litigation would decrease the value of the bankruptcy
estate more than not selling one of their greatest assets.
C. Opt-Out
Many companies decided to use an opt-out policy, allowing
individuals who specifically request to have their names removed
to choose not to be included in the sold customer lists. 266 For
example, when Living.corn declared bankruptcy, the Texas
Attorney General's Office opposed the sale of the customer list,
seeking an injunction from the bankruptcy court to prevent the
sale.267 The Attorney General's Office and Living.com reached a
settlement whereby:

262. See Greg Sandoval, Failed Dot-Corns May Be Selling Your Privacy
Information, CNET NEWS.COM, June 29, 2000, availableat

http://news.com.com/2100-1017-242649.html?legacy=cnet

(last visited Mar. 26,

2002).

263. See Davidson, supra note 12.
264. The Texas Attorney General's Office has "built... a reputation for
stalking listsellers," causing many to give up on the endeavor. Id.
265. See id.
266. See Piera, supra note 178, at 14.
267. See Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, State of Texas,
Comyn Announces Privacy Settlement with Living.com -Protects Texans
Privacy Rights (Sept. 25, 2000), available at

http://www.oag.state.tx.us/newspubslreleases/2000/20000925living.com.htm (last
visited Mar. 26, 2002).
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The court-appointed bankruptcy trustee will oversee the
destruction of the customers' personal financial data such as
credit card, bank account and social security numbers. While
the bankruptcy trustee may sell or transfer the customer listexcluding credit card, bank account and social security
numbers-she may do so only after giving notice to all of
living.com's customers and giving the consumers an opportunity
to opt-out of the proposed sale."'

The bankruptcy court approved the settlement269 and the list
was ultimately sold to Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia and the
Maxwell Sroge Company for $100 per 1,000 names."
When Voter.com went out of business," it sought to sell its
subscriber list, including email addresses, party affiliations, issues
of interest to the users, gender data, and zip codes, but not names
or addresses. 272 Voter.com decided to sell its list only to buyers
who would use it for the same purpose it had." 3 The company also
promised to contact every person on the list and give them the
chance to opt-out. 4 However, Voter.com did hope to sell its list to
up to four different buyers.v5 It has not been reported who
purchased Voter.com's subscriber information or under what
terms.
When Egghead.com filed for bankruptcy, its bankruptcy judge

268. See id.; see also Davidson, supra note 12.
269. See Susan Stellin, Dot-Corn Liquidations Put Consumer Data in Limbo,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2000, at C4.
270. See Davidson, supra note 12.
271. See David McGuire, Privacy Advocates Question Voter.com's Subscriber
List Sale, NEWSBYTES, Sept. 16, 2001, availableat
http://www.infowar.com/class-1/01/classl_031601a_j.shtml (last visited Sept. 26,
2002).
272. See Aaron Pressman, Voter.com to Sell Membership List, INDUS. STAND.,
Mar. 15, 2001,
available at http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,22894,00.html (last visited
Jan. 24,2002).
273. See McGuire, supra note 271.
274. See Pressman, supra note 272 (noting, however, that privacy advocates
were still concerned that the sale of the list could result in misuse if it were sold to
partisan groups that the subscribers disagreed with).
275. See id.; see also McGuire, supra note 271.
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indicated that an opt-out policy was not required.276 Egghead.com
nonetheless tried to use the opt-out option to avoid any privacy
challenges in a sale deal with Fry's Electronics ("Fry's").7 Fry's
required that no more that ten percent of active users, defined as
buyers having made a purchase on Egghead.com in the past two
years, opt-out.2 78 Fry agreed not to disclose the customer data upon
receipt. 9 The ten percent requirement gave great leveraging
power in their bargaining with Egghead.com; if the terms were not
met, Fry's could use the fact to lower the price." ° On the other
hand, such terms undermine attempts to maximize the bankruptcy
estate.2 1 ' The deal ultimately fell apart and Egghead.com's assets
were acquired by Amazon.com, which agreed to honor
Egghead.com's privacy policy.'
Unlike Egghead.com and Voter.com, More.com saw the
writing on the wall and eased its privacy policy before selling its
customer list. 283 Purchaser HealthCentral.com did not obtain either
the health data or shopping histories of the customers on the list
and offered $25 off to customers remaining on the list after an optout option was
extended. 4 No regulatory action was taken against
2 15
More.com.
Despite the risk that lists purchased with opt-out options may
not have as many names as the original customer lists, 286 many
companies have nonetheless purchased these lists. W. Atlee
Burpee & Co. bought the Garden.com customer list, after listees
had a chance to opt-out, in an attempt to, attract younger

276.
277.

See Tessler, supra note 251.
See Wolverton, supra note 250 (noting that Fry believed that the opt-out

provision would protect consumer privacy).
278. See id.
279.

See id.

280.
281.
282.

See id.
See supra Part I.A.
See Alorie Gilbert, Egghead.com Bounces Back Under Amazon, CNET

NEws.coM,

Dec.

18,

2001,

available at http://news.com.com/2100-1017-

277185.html?legacy=cnet (last visited Mar. 26, 2002).
283. See Davidson, supra note 12.
284. See id.
285. See Beckmann, supra note 21, at 790.
286. See Tessler, supra note 251.
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customers. 7' Similarly, eVineyards bought Wine.com's customer
list after an opt-out option because a certain amount of customer
information had to be turned over in order to honor Wine.com's
many outstanding orders and gift certificates.2 88
In response to the Toysmart case, many companies have
chosen to give people on customer lists the chance to opt-out. In
some cases, more sensitive information was not disclosed; in other
cases, the lists could only be sold to parties with similar goals as the
selling party. Still other companies have eased their policies, along
with using opt-out, to keep the sales from being stopped. Opt-out
has not stopped buyers from being interested in customer lists, as
the lists allow purchasers to target different types of customers or
because the nature of the sales required that a certain amount of
information be transferred. However the opt-out "provision that is
meant to reassure customers about their privacy ends up being
something that devalues a key asset of the company, which is its
'
customer list."289
At least one company has limited the amount of
customers that can opt-out to ensure that the list is not worthless
because too many people have opted-out.2

D. Opt-In
Other defunct Internet businesses have granted even more
privacy to their subscribers, selling customer lists after the listees
decide to opt-in, where all of the people on the list specifically
287. Weintraub, supra note 13. As the terms of the sale were not disclosed, it
is unclear which, if either party, requested the opt-out option. See Moira Cotlier,
Market in Bloom, CATALOG AGE, Apr. 2001.

288. See Tessler, supra note 251 (citing eVineyard's Chief Marketing Officer
Brett Lauter). Of the customer names purchased, approximately 30% were
discarded because eVineyard did not believe it could legally ship alcohol to

customers in certain states. See Thane Peterson, E-Cheers from Larry Gerhard:
The eVineyard.com CEO's Conservatism Has Kept the Company Flowing As
Other Wine-Selling Dot-Coin's Dried Up. How He's Thinking Big, BUSINESS WK.
ONLINE, July 17, 2001. It is unclear whether either Wine.com or eVineyard was

responsible for the decision to give customers the choice to opt-out.
289. Wolverton, supra note 250 (quoting attorney Rick Gray).
290. See supra note 278 and accompanying text (discussing how Fry would
only purchase the Egghead.com customer list if less than ten percent of the
customers opted out).
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indicate that they would like their information to be shared."9 "In
some sense, what many of these companies are trying to do is
amend the privacy policies they had in place when they were still in
business."2 By asking for permission to sell the information, the
companies are remaining within the privacy promises they made. 93
In the case of eToys.com, a complaint by the Texas Attorney
General before the eToys bankruptcy court resulted in a
settlement requiring the list, ultimately sold to KB Toys, to be
-subject to opt-in.29
However, when Webvan.com went out of business,
WhyRunOut.com was willing to buy its customer list after those on
the list chose to opt-in because "while we're not getting 100
percent of their list.. . the ones we aren't getting are the ones who
aren't interested in our service anyway.1 295
In the end,
WhyRunOut.com got less than ten thousand names from the
customer list,9 a fraction of the 160,000 Webvan users as of July
2000.2n
Opt-in essentially solves the problem of violating privacy
promises to increase the value of customer lists because although a
promise initially existed, it is replaced by a second agreement,
allowing the transfer of the information.
E. Changes in Privacy Policy
Following the Toysmart case, which emphasized the conflict
291. See Piera, supra note 178, at 14.
292
See Tessler, supra note 251 (quoting technology law attorney Patrick
Guevara).
293. See id.
294. See Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, State of Texas,
Cornyn Victorious in "eToys" Case-Privacy Protection Action Secures Rights
of 3 Million Online Customers (May 18, 2001), available at
http://www.oag.state.tx.us/newspubs/releases/2001/20010518etoys2.htm
(last
visited Mar. 26, 2002).
295. Tessler, supra note 251 (quoting WhyRunOut.com's Chief Executive
Officer Dan Frahm).
296. See id.
297. See Webvan's Loss Widens as Company Expands, USATODAY.COM, July
13, 2000, availableat
http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/invest/in872.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2002).
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between maximizing bankruptcy estates and protecting consumer

privacy (and ensuring that companies abide by their privacy
promises), some companies simply changed their privacy policies
to allow for disclosure of customer lists upon sale.298 For example,
Amazon.com changed its privacy policy because of Toysmar 99 to
include a section entitled "Business Transfers," which states:
As we continue to develop our business, we might sell or buy
stores or assets. In such transactions, customer information
generally is one of the transferred business assets. Also, in the
unlikely event that Amazon.com, Inc., or substantially all of its
assets are acquired, customer information will of course be one
of the transferred assets.3

Amazon believes that the new policy actually affords
customers greater protection. Patty Smith, one of Amazon's
representatives, says "the privacy policy is actually stricter now
because it promises not to sell data except in certain instances. '
Likewise, eBay.com altered its privacy policy in response to
Toysmart3 ° The relevant part of the policy now states:
It is possible that eBay, its subsidiaries, its joint ventures, or any
combination of such, could merge with or be acquired by
another business entity. Should such a combination occur, you
should expect that eBay would share some or all of your
information in order to continue to provide the service. You
will receive notice of such event (to the extent it occurs) as
provided in Section 11 ("Notice") and we will require that the
new combined entity follow the practices disclosed in this
298. See Jeffery Benner, eBay Alters Privacy Policy, WIRED NEWS, Apr. 2,
2001, available at
http://www.wired.com/newsbusiness/O,1367,42778,00.html (last visited Mar. 26,
2002); see also Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 836.
299. See Beckmann, supra note 21, at 788; see also Wolverton, supra note 250;
Reidenberg, Toysmart, supra note 216; Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at
836-37; Blakeley, supra note 13; Davidson, supra note 12.
300. Amazon.com Privacy Notice, at
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/browse/-/468496/002-4154388-1678443
(last visited Sept. 19, 2002).
301. Davidson, supra note 12.
302 See Benner, supra note 298; see also Reidenberg, supra note 216; Miller &
O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 836-37.
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Privacy Policy.

If the eBay list were sold, customers or consumer protection
groups may still be able to challenge the sale of the list if the
successor company fails to abide by the eBay privacy policy.
However, it is unclear whether any buyer would be willing to risk
litigation or conflict " instead of simply paying a lower price for the
diminished value of the list.
As stated above, one simple solution to the Toysmart problem
has simply been to change privacy policies to allow disclosure of
customer information upon sale, merger, or acquisition. These
changes in privacy policy "preclude any future action for 'unfair or
deceptive' practices and diminish the level of privacy protection
afforded to consumers in the case of corporate bankruptcies. 305
Rather, customer lists could simply be sold because there is no law
(bankruptcy or otherwise) that would bar the sale." 6 "In the
future, many companies are unlikely to have any such privacy
policy that would offer consumers or state prosecutors the
opportunity to challenge the disposition of personal information in
a bankruptcy."3 7 If most Internet businesses change their policies
in a similar manner, the Toysmart problem could simply go away,
leaving consumers unprotected when customer lists are sold

303. eBay Privacy Policy, at http://pages.ebay.com/help/community/pngpriv.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2002).
304. Certainly, other companies, such as Craftshop.com, Voter.com,
More.com and WhyRunOut.com, have been willing to better abide by their own
privacy promises in order to prevent the sale of customer lists from being
challenged. See supra Parts III.B-III.D.
305. Reidenberg, supra note 216. However, one could argue that by altering
the privacy policy, it only applies to new customers, not to those who made
purchases under the old policy. See Robert L. Eisenbach III, The Internet
Company's Customer List Asset or Liability?, COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW,
Aug. 2001, at 25. "If a company wants the old customer information to be
governed by its new privacy policy, it may be required to alert each customer of
the change and give the customer the opportunity to choose whether or not they
want their information governed by the new privacy policy." Id. (citing TRUSTe
Model Privacy Statement).
306. See Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 837.
307. Reidenberg, supra note 216.
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because of bankruptcy.

8

F. When Is the Problem Less Problematic?
The Toysmart problem, however, is not as relevant if the

Internet business is acquired or merged, instead of going through
bankruptcy or going out of business3 9 because "[w]hen a company
declares bankruptcy, all bets are off."" 0 A bankruptcy judge can
declare contracts void to maximize the value of the estate."'
However, when a company is acquired or merged, the
purchaser is essentially a successor-in-interest and is bound by the

privacy promise.3"2 A merger is the absorption of one company by
another, where the surviving corporation obtains all the assets,
liabilities and powers of the acquired company."'
company buys substantially all the assets of another
opposed to purchasing the stock of the company to
courts will hold that the acquisition is a de facto

Where one
company, as
be acquired,
merger and

impose successor liability."' "[A]s a general rule, in the bricks-andmortar world, the assignment of substantially all assets of one
company to a new company binds that new company to the

obligations of the former company.

'

308. See Beckmann, supra note 21, at 790 ("The only logical response from the
[e-commerce] industry would be to lower the standard of privacy practices to
resemble Amazon's new approach.").
309. See Manny Madriaga, A Treasure Hunt Among the Dot-Corn Ruins,
available at
http://www.iploft.com/articles3.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2002); see also Tessler,
supra note 251.
310. Tessler, supra note 251 (quoting TRUSTe spokesman David Steer).
311. See id. (quoting TRUSTe spokesman David Steer).
312. See Linda Rosencrance, Sale of More.com's Customer List Raises Privacy
Concerns,CNN.CoM, Oct. 27, 2000, availableat
http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computingl10/27/online.privacy.idg/ (last visited
Sept. 27, 2002).
313. See Douglas R. Richmond, Products Liability: CorporateSuccessors and
the Duty to Warn, 45 BAYLOR L. REv. 535, 554 (1993).
314. See J. Maxwell Tucker, The Clash of Successor Liability Principles,
ReorganizationLaw, and the Just Demand That Relief Be Afforded Unknown and
Unknowable Claimants,12 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 11 (1995).
315. Rosencrance, supra note 312 (quoting Pennie & Edmonds attorney
Jonathan Moskin).
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Likewise, a "[c]onsolidation occurs where two or more
constituent corporations consolidate and a single new corporation
is created. The prior constituents cease to exist following
consolidation. The new, successor
corporation assumes the assets
36
and liabilities of its constituents.,

1

Whether the acquisition amounts to a merger or consolidation,
the surviving company assumes the liabilities of the predecessor
company or companies." ' The underlying theory for successor
liability is that the old company did not cease to exist, "but merely
directed the blood of the old corporation into the veins of the
new."3 ' The successor liability rule is a cornerstone of corporate
law that is generally codified."9
As a result, when defunct Internet companies are merged or

acquired by other entities, the acquirer assumes the liabilities of
the old company, including the privacy promises."'
This
assumption of liability is generally enough to satisfy the FTC that
customer data will be adequately protected. 1
However, in
bankruptcy, where assets are sold off piece by piece, the liabilities

are not passed to the purchaser, so that the seller is essentially
violating its own privacy policy.
316. Richmond, supra note 313, at 554.
317. See id. at 554.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. While the transmission of a customer list as part of a merger or
acquisition could still technically constitute a violation of a privacy policy, it is
unlikely to be challenged because the successor in interest is bound to the
original terms of the privacy policy. See supra note 251 and accompanying text
(discussing how the FTC considers whether a list is being sold to a similar
company, whether it is being sold as part of a larger sale or individually, and what
information is being sold when deciding whether to challenge the sale).
However, this fails to consider a situation in which a small, local business is taken
over by a large, national "mega-company." While the sale could require the
buyer to abide by the seller's existing privacy policy in such a sale, the extreme
difference in size between the two companies, and therefore their abilities to
exploit such information, could in itself constitute a breach of the promise. Given
that challenging the sale of customer lists is quite recent, no one has either
opposed a sale for this reason or undertaken an academic discourse on the
subject.
321. See supra note 251 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.A
(discussing the Toysmart settlement).
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IV. RESOLUTION

A. Policy Interests Regarding Customer Lists in E-Commerce
There are certain policy interests that must be considered
when discussing the sale of customer lists from failed Internet
businesses. While the use of the Internet is growing, s22 the Internet
will not reach its full potential if consumers fear that their privacy
will not be protected.3 23 Any consideration of policy interests must
be aimed at maximizing economic return and consumer sales while
at the same time addressing the legitimate privacy concerns of
users. Essentially, companies should be able to sell to interested
customers and said customers should feel safe entering into such
transactions.
Secondly, when discussing online privacy and customer lists,
one must remember that many Internet companies receive
financing through venture capital investment.
The burst of the
Internet bubble does not mean that all investment in Internet
companies is over.3" While venture capitalism is not without risks,
an investor's loss can be minimized by maximizing the value of
assets of a failed company.326 If customer lists are barred from sale
or subject to litigation, leaving little else of value in the estate of
the failed company, investing companies may opt to place their
money in safer, less unstable ventures. As a result, investment in
Internet companies could diminish further, reducing consumer
convenience, competition, and economic growth in the retail
sector.

322.

See supra Part II.A.

323.

See Beckmann, supra note 21, at 770.

324.

See Wingate, supra note 13, at 915-16 (indicating that venture capitalists

are still willing to invest in start-ups, despite the Internet bubble burst).
325. See id. at 916 ("Many venture capitalists declare that they will continue to
invest heavily in the development of e-commerce.").
326. Accord id. at 917-18 (noting that venture capitalists have shifted some

funds from Internet companies to the telecommunications industry in part
because of the ability of failed telecom companies to sell their bandwidth,
allowing the venture capital company some degree of recovery).
327. See id. at 918.
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B. Proposed Legislation to Protect Consumers
After the Toysmart fiasco, much legislative attention was given
to the problem of selling customer lists protected by privacy
promises. 2 Below is a brief explanation of proposed legislation,
with a focus on the pending Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001.
. The Online Privacy ProtectionAct of 2001
The purpose of H.R. 89, also known as the Online Privacy
Protection Act of 2001, is:
To require the Federal Trade Commission to prescribe
regulations to protect the privacy of personal information
collected from and about individuals who are not covered by
the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 on the
Internet, to provide greater individual control over the
collection and use of that information, and for other
329
purposes.

Such regulations must require webpage operators to clearly
post a notice indicating what information is collected, allow users
to limit the use of the information or consent to its use for nontransactional purposes, and require that webpage operators to
establish procedures for protecting information.33
Thus H.R. 89 gives the FTC the power to require all
companies to allow users to limit the use of their information, even
if the users would have willingly done business with the company
without a privacy policy. As a result, customer lists and their
monetary value to buyers could be curtailed in situations where
lists could have been compiled and sold without any objections
from website users.

328. See Reidenberg, supra note 216 ("A second trend [resulting from
Toysmart] is the legislative effort to revise the bankruptcy code."); see also Miller
& O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 839.
329. Online Privacy Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 89, 107th Cong. (2001),
availableat
http://www.steptoe.com/webdoc.nsf/Files/HR89/$file/HR89.pdf (last visited Mar.
28, 2002).
330. Id.
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Moreover, H.R. 89 does not expressly prohibit the sale of
customer information; its main focus is on ensuring that customers
are informed about how their information is used. As such, it does
not necessarily resolve the Toysmart problem, as it does not bind
companies to uphold their privacy promises. Companies can
simply alter their policies to allow for disclosure upon sale.33 '
2. The Consumer Internet Privacy EnhancementAct
The Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement Act, H.R. 237,
is intended to protect the privacy of Internet customers. 32 Like the
Online Privacy Protection Act, the Consumer Internet Privacy
Enhancement Act requires web operators to provide notice and
allow consumers to limit the use of such information.333 However,
H.R. 237 does not empower the FTC to dictate the terms of
collecting consumer data; rather it explicitly makes the collection
of such information without notice and the opportunity to opt-out
illegal.3 ' As with the Online Privacy Protection Act, H.R. 237
forces companies to provide a limitation for the uses of consumer
information though the company would rather simply have no
privacy policy and it does not resolve the Toysmart issue because
companies may simply alter their policies to allow for the sale of
customer lists.
3. The Consumer Online Privacy and DisclosureAct
The Consumer Online Privacy and Disclosure Act, H.R. 347,335
is essentially a combination of the Online Privacy Protection Act
and the Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement Act. It requires
the FTC to draft privacy rules and also makes the collection of
331. See supra Part III.E.
332. Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement Act, H.R. 237, 107th Cong.
(2001), available at http://www.wow-com.com/pdf/hr237introeshoo.pdf (last
visited Mar. 28, 2002).
333. See id.
334. Id.
335. Consumer Online Privacy and Disclosure Act, H.R. 347, 107th Cong.
(2001), available at http://www.wow-com.com/pdf/hr347introgreen.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 28, 2002).
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consumer data illegal without notice and opt-out opportunities.36
As with previously discussed legislation, it forces privacy policies
upon Internet companies and does not directly resolve the
Toysmart problem, for the reasons outlined above.
4. The Privacy Policy Enforcement in Bankruptcy Act of 2000
The Privacy Policy Enforcement in Bankruptcy Act, S. 2857,
seeks to amend the Bankruptcy Code to exclude personally
identifiable information from the assets of a debtor. 38 This
legislation seeks to create a new § 541(b)(6) in the Bankruptcy
Code, which would state: "(6) if the sale or disclosure of personally
identifiable information violates a privacy policy of the debtor in
effect at the time at which such information was collected, such
personally identifiable information."3 9 This act force sites to honor
their privacy policies but does not require consumer consent for
the sale of information. ° and would simply result in Internet
businesses changing their privacy policies like Amazon and eBay
did in the wake of Toysmart."'
5. The Consumer Privacy ProtectionAct
The Consumer Privacy Protection Act, S. 2606, like much of
the aforementioned legislation, requires that customers be given
notice about a site's privacy policy.3 2 Similarly, the Consumer
Privacy Protection Act requires that web page operators obtain
affirmative consent from customers before collecting personally
336.
337.
338.
Cong.

Id.
See supra Part IV.B.1.
See Privacy Policy Enforcement in Bankruptcy Act of 2000, S. 2857, 106th
(2000); see also Leahy: New Senate Bill Would Enforce Privacy Policies of

Firms in Bankruptcy, Plugging "The Toysmart Loophole," U.S. NEWSWIRE, July

12, 2000.
339. Privacy Policy Enforcement in Bankruptcy Act of 2000, S.2857, 106th
Cong. (2000).
340. See Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 841.
341. See Beckmann, supra note 21, at 789; see also Miller & O'Rourke, supra
note 13, at 841 ('If the market continues to move to privacy policies that
authorize sale, this legislation would effectively be a dead letter.").
342. Consumer Privacy Protection Act, S.2606, 106th Cong. § 102(a) (2000).

326

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VIII
FINANCIAL LAW

identifiable information.3 3
Additionally, S. 2606 removes
personally identifiable information from a debtor's assets by
amending the Bankruptcy Code.'" By doing so, the Consumer
Privacy Protection Act precludes creditors of failed Internet
businesses from obtaining the maximum return on their losses by
prohibiting the sale of one of the debtor's most valuable assetsit's customer list."5 While this legislation would solve the Toysmart
problem, it would be problematic from a bankruptcy standpoint, as
creditors could not realize even a fractional return on their losses." 6
This could discourage or prevent companies from investing in
Internet businesses. Moreover, it dictates that companies not sell
certain information that they might otherwise be able to because
the company would not have opted to use a privacy policy as a
term of conducting business with a consumer.
6. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of2001
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420 and H.R. 333,
seeks to amend the bankruptcy code to include customer lists
within the definition of property and to require a separate hearing
to sell non-public personal information protected by a privacy
promise at the time of the bankruptcy filing. 8 To this end, if the
trustee wishes to sell such information, she must request the court
to appoint an ombudsman. 49

343.

Id. § 102(b).

344. Id. § 601.
345. See Beckmann, supra note 21, at 789.
346. See id. at 791 (stating that "this bill would cripple the online direct
marketing industry.").
347. See id.
348. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420, 107th Cong. § 231 (2001); see
also Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, H.R. 333, 107th Cong. § 231 (2001).

Because the relevant sections of S. 420 and H.R. 333 are identical and for the
sake of ease, the remainder of this discussion will cite only to the Senate version.
349. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S.420, 107th Cong. § 232(a)(1)
(2001).
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It shall be the duty of the ombudsman to provide the court
information to assist the court in its consideration of the facts,
circumstances, and conditions of the sale or lease under section
363(b)(1)(B) of title 11, United States Code, as amended by this
Act. Such information may include a presentation of the
debtor's privacy policy in effect, potential losses or gains of
privacy to consumers if the sale or lease is approved, potential
costs or benefits to consumers if the sale or lease is approved,
and potential alternatives which mitigate potential privacy
350
losses or potential costs to consumers.

The Bankruptcy Reform Act does not expressly forbid the sale
of customer lists but simply formalizes the use of a balancing test
similar to the one the FTC currently uses."' However, the test is
employed by the bankruptcy courts, not the FTC, which could
'
Aside from
simply allow the sale, "with or without conditions."352
the recommendations of the ombudsman, which the court is not
bound by,353 a bankruptcy judge considers both the interests of the
customers whose data is compiled and the interests of the creditors.
Presumably, this would allow the sale of information not covered
by a privacy policy. However, S. 420 does not establish explicit
rules for allowing and disallowing such sales, which could
Moreover, because of its
potentially lead to inconsistencies."
broad language, it will take courts some time to create precedent.
What may be more frightening is that the legislation could
simply allow Internet companies to change their privacy policies
immediately preceding bankruptcy filings. 55 "[I]f the policy is not
in effect when the petition is filed the protective provision
'
Additionally, by amending the
ostensibly does not apply."356
Bankruptcy Code to include customer lists within the definition of
property, the amendment renders irrelevant any outside

350. Id. § 232(a)(B)(2).
351. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
352. See Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 844.
353. See id. at 845 ("[T]he court is free to reject whatever recommendation the
ombudsman makes.").
354. See id. at 845 (indicating that S. 420 "would create a good deal of
uncertainty for both consumers and creditors").
355. See id. at 844.
356. See id.
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interpretation considering such lists to be contacts subject to
enforcement. 7
7. Pending State Legislation
Aside from the above-mentioned legislation, there are
currently hundreds of bills pending in state legislatures across the
country."8 Because the of the easy access to the Internet and the
fact that online companies are doing business in every state in the
nation, "the most restrictive of the state laws will become the de
3 9
facto national standard.""
Given the nationwide (and global)
implications of Internet business and technology, a federal solution
seems far more appropriate."w
C. Third Party Customer Information Management
One other solution that has been implemented because of
growing concern about the sale of customer data has been to allow
third parties to own and manage consumer data."' While such an
arrangement simply does away with the conflict, it does not allow
companies to use their lists as collateral, which in turn limits their
ability to get financial backing.362
Furthermore, if Internet
companies no longer have their customer lists, their assets at
bankruptcy are likely to be quite limited. There may be very little
else of value to settle debts with creditors.
D. An Academic Solution
Professor Walter W. Miller and Maureen A. O'Rourke of the
Boston University School of Law have proposed yet another
solution.363 They suggest a two prong solution requiring that (1)
websites provide explicit (and conspicuous) privacy notices,
357.
358.

See id.
See Beckmann, supra note 21, at 791; see also Blakeley, supra note 13.

359.
360.
361.
362.

Beckmann, supra note 21, at 791.
See id.
See Davidson, supra note 12.
See id.

363.

See Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 847-53.
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explaining to users how their information could be treated in case
of bankruptcy" and (2) the Bankruptcy Code be amended to
require enforcement of privacy policies or sale be allowed under
terms similar to those in Toysmart.365
This solution balances the needs of customers and bankrupt
The conspicuous notice requirement clarifies
companies.
consumer awareness about their rights to and control of their
Moreover, it formalizes the FTC's solution in
information.
Toysmart, " creating a consistent rule for when failing Internet
companies wish to sell customer information. The Toysmart
solution also attempts to satisfy both customers and failed Internet
companies.36 Professors Miller and O'Rourke suggest that this
solution will prevent websites from providing non-disclosure
privacy policies368 They also indicate that an ombudsman should be
allowed to challenge a sale of a customer list and that some
information should be considered unalienable and therefore
absolutely prohibited from sale. 69 The professors admit that it is
unclear whether Congress has the power to make certain
information unalienable as it would generally fall under the realm
of state power."'
While the Miller/O'Rourke solution is certainly the result of
much greater consideration of all of the nuances of the problem, it
does force creditors to bear the cost of the reduced value of
customer lists. This is especially problematic in cases where a
website does not have any privacy policy. The above solution
forces companies to dictate a privacy policy and then restricts the
sale of information that could have otherwise been sold without
Moreover, the restrictions that the
any legal challenge.
Miller/O'Rourke solution suggests limits transferability, and as
such, the value of such lists. Perhaps the creditors are those in the

364. See id. at 847-49.
365. See id. at 847-51.
366. See supra notes 234-37 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 234-37 and accompanying text.
368. See Miller & O'Rourke, supra note 13, at 850.
369. See id. at 852.
370. See id. (indicating that perhaps such a right could be imposed using the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution).
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best position to bear the risk,37 ' but it is unlikely that they will
support any solution that will devalue the estate.
Moreover, their solution does not address the problem of the
sale of lists outside of bankruptcy, such as in a merger or
acquisition.372

Presumably, because

the sale would not

be

objectionable to the professors because it would likely be to a
company in a similar line of business. However, this is certainly
3 and for the sake of consistency, their solution
not guaranteed 73
should include the sale of all lists, not just those stemming from
bankruptcy.
Despite the issues listed above, the Miller/O'Rourke solution
certain addresses most of the concerns about the sale of customer
lists and has the most merit.
CONCLUSION

There is clearly a conflict of interest between the goals of
bankruptcy law and consumer privacy. However, what is more
alarming is that customer data has been sold for many years
without any protests from consumers. The sudden worries by
Internet customers374 are contrary to the lack of vocal interest of
brick and mortar customers. It seems quite clear that customers of
traditional brick and mortar businesses never really considered
that their information was being saved and could ultimately be
sold. It is time that consumer awareness about all data compilation
is increased.
Certainly, any solution to the sale of customer data should be
the same for Internet and traditional businesses. There should not
be two different rules for two essentially identical failing businesses
371.

See generally Rafael Efrat, The Fresh-State Policy in Bankruptcy in

Modern Day Israel, 7 AM.

BANKR. INST.

L. REv. 555, 559 (1999) (discussing

whether debtors or creditors are better risk-bearers).
372. See supra Part III.F.
373. See supra Part III.C (discussing how the Voter.com could have been sold
to a partisan group that the subscribers did not agree with).
374. See Jones & Evans, supra note 51 (quoting Meg Smith, a fellow at
Harvard University's Berkman Center for Internet and Society, as saying "[u]ntil
we get the average person excited about this [sale of customer information], this
isn't going to go anywhere [in terms of legislative change]").
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simply because one is a brick and mortar store and the other exists
only online. For example, a traditional pharmacy should not be
able to sell its customer data when it fails while its Internet
counterpart is prevented from doing so.
Aside from these concerns however, it is clear that a failing
Internet business will have fewer legal concerns about selling a
customer list if it is merged with or acquired by another company.
Consumer privacy battles, for the moment, are confined to
piecemeal bankruptcy or going out of business sales, where the
successor in interest is bound to honor the policies of the company
it has acquired.
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